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NOTES
PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN NEW YORK:
SECTION 2-318 OF THE U.C.C.-
THE AMENDMENT WITHOUT A CAUSE
INTRODUCTION
Rarely in the law do log jams of doctrine develop as often as in the
area of products liability. Depending on the facts of a particular case,
a plaintiff seeking redress for personal injury or property damage can
bring as many as six causes of action: strict liability in tort,' misrepre-
sentation,2 negligence, 3 breach of implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity,4 breach of express warranty, s and breach of warranty of fitness
1. In most jurisdictions strict liability in tort is a common-law action, the
generally accepted version of which is found in § 402A of the Second Restatement of
Torts: "(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the
seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and
does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which
it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user
or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation
with the seller." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). Although New York
has adopted a similar version, it applies to bystanders as well as to users and
consumers, and it places a duty on the latter two parties to use reasonable means to
discover the defect and to avoid their own harm. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330,
342-43, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 469-70 (1973).
2. In a misrepresentation suit, usually a common-law action, liability attaches
when a misrepresentation of a material fact by the seller results in injury, even
though the seller did not make the statement negligently or fraudulently. Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 402B (1965); see Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 114,
534 P.2d 377, 383, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681, 687 (1975).
3. A negligence action to redress a product-caused injury is based on the manu-
facturer's common-law duty of due care in making and marketing goods that are
potentially harmful. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111
N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916). See generally Noel, Manufacturers' Liability for Negligence,
33 Tenn. L. Rev. 444 (1966).
4. Breach of implied warranty of merchantability is a statutory action permit-
ted by the Uniform Commercial Code. "Where the buyer has accepted goods. . . he
may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the loss resulting in the
ordinary course of events from the seller's breach.. .[and, in some casesI incidental
and consequential damages ...." U.C.C. § 2-714 (1977). The implied warranty
existed in New York prior to the adoption of the Code. See Schwartz v. Macrose
Lumber & Trim Co., 50 Misc. 2d 547, 551-53, 270 N.Y.S.2d 875, 882-83 (Sup. Ct.
1966), reo'd on other grounds, 29 A.D.2d 781, 287 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1968), ajf'd 24
N.Y.2d 856, 248 N.E.2d 920, 301 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1969). The plaintiff buyer who
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for particular purpose." Of these actions, two are the most widely
used means for protecting plaintiffs from personal injury or property
damage 7 caused by the non-negligent conduct of a seller or manufac-
proves a breach of warranty may recover the difference between the value of the
nonconforming goods received and the contract price, U.C.C. § 2-714 (1977), as well
as incidental and consequential damages. Id. §§ 2-714 to -715. In addition to breach
of warranty, the definition of nonconformity also includes faulty method of tender or
any other failure to comply with the terms of the contract for sale. Id. § 2-714 official
comment 2. In a breach of implied warranty case, the plaintiff contends that the
goods are nonconforming because they do not meet certain minimum standards of
quality that all such goods should possess. The Code requires that "[g]oods to be
merchantable must be at least such as (a) pass without objection in the trade under
the contract description; and (b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average
quality within the description; and (c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used; and (d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement,
of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved;
and (e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and (f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the con-
tainer or label if any." Id. § 2-314(2). Additionally, the provision on implied war-
ranty states that the serving of food or drink for value is a sale, id. § 2-314(1), and
that warranties can arise from course of dealing or usage of trade. Id. § 2-314(3).
5. An action for breach of express warranty is premised on an affirmative
assertion of quality by the seller. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1977); see McCarty v. E.J.
Korvette, Inc., 28 Md. App. 421, 437-38, 347 A.2d 253, 264-65 (1975).
6. Breach of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose occurs when the
product fails to perform a specific function for which the plaintiff bought it, and
when the seller had reason to know the plaintiff's intended use. U.C.C. §§ 2-315,
-714 (1977); see Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 279, 286-87, 246 A.2d
11, 15-16 (1968), aff'd, 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969). Additionally, one commen-
tator has suggested that, because some manufacturers know to a substantial certainty
that a percentage of users will be harmed by their products, the act of marketing such
a product resembles an intentional tort. Twerski, The Use and Abuse oJ Comparative
Negligence in Products Liability, 10 Ind. L. Rev. 797, 799-800 (1977).
7. A distinction exists between economic loss on the one hand and property
damage and personal injury on the other. When the buyer's sole complaint is that the
product does not meet a level of quality he had been led to expect, he suffers
economic loss, and damages may be recovered for loss of benefit of the bargain,
reliance expenses, cost of replacement and repair, lost profits, and similar harm that
is not overly speculative. J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the
Uniform Commercial Code 405 (2d ed. 1980). Economic loss has been termed
"insufficient product value." Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurispru-
dence, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 917, 918 (1966). Property damage is harm to property
other than the defective product itself. See Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry
County Spraying Serv., 572 S.W.2d 308, 316-17 (Tex. 1978) (Pope, J., dissenting).
For example, when a defective television catches fire and destroys a home, the
destruction of the television is economic loss; the destruction of the house is property
damage. Few courts allow economic losses to be recovered through strict liability.
See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 16-19, 403 P.2d 145, 150-52, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17, 22-24 (1965); Steckmar Nat'l Realty & Inv. Co. v. J I Case Co., 99 Misc. 2d
212, 214, 415 N.Y.S.2d 946, 948 (Sup. Ct. 1979). Strict liability in all versions
permits recovery for both property damage and personal injury. Codling v. Paglia,
32 N.Y.2d 330, 342-43, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 469-70 (1973)
(personal injury and property damage); John R. Dudley Constr., Inc. v. Drott Mfg.
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turer;8 breach of implied warranty of merchantability and strict tort
liability.9 Because strict liability developed from breach of warranty,
they are remarkably similar. The availability of breach of warranty,
however, depends on such elements as the requirement of notice, 10
the effectiveness of disclaimers, " a statute of limitations that may bar
plaintiff before he is injured, 12 and to some extent the requirement
that only those in contractual relation with the defendant '3 can
sue.' 4  While these elements may be appropriate in a commercial
Co., 66 A.D.2d 368, 371, 412 N.Y.S.2d 512, 514 (1979) (property damage); Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) (personal injury and property damage). Al-
though the primary warranty remedy under the Code is recovery for economic loss,
the statute specifically allows personal injury and property damages as elements of
consequential recovery. See supra note 4: Under the Code, the buyer may recover
consequential damages caused by the seller's breach, whether he retains the faulty
goods, rejects them, or revokes acceptance. U.C.C. §§ 2-711 to -714 (1977). Conse-
quential damages include personal injury and property damage. Id. § 2-715(2)(b).
This recovery, however, is subject to the limitation that the breach be one of
warranty, rather than, for example, manner of tender. Id. A prior portion of the
section allows the buyer to recover damages for any breach, provided the buyer's loss
resulted from "requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting
had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented." Id. § 2-715(2)(a).
Thus, it might be argued that personal injury and property damage are recoverable
under § 2-715(2)(a) even absent a breach of warranty if the harm was foreseeable at
the time of contracting, the buyer was unable to prevent the injury, and there was a
proximate relation between the breach and the harm. See Deutsch Relays, Inc. v.
Giffords Oil Co., 105 Misc. 2d 524, 525-26, 432 N.Y.S.2d 448, 448-49 (Sup. Ct.
1980) (careless delivery of oil, rather than its unmerchantable nature, resulting in fire
actionable under Code).
8. Strict liability actions may be maintained only against one in the business of
selling products, rather than a onetime or other noncommercial seller. Coutu v. Otis
Elevator Co., 58 A.D.2d 131, 132, 395 N.Y.S.2d 754, 756 (1977); Mead v. Warner
Pruyn Div., 57 A.D.2d 340, 343-44, 394 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485 (1977); Nickel v. Hyster
Co., 97 Misc. 2d 770, 773, 412 N.Y.S.2d 273, 276 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Queensbury
Union Free School Dist. v. Jim Walter Corp., 91 Misc. 2d 804, 809, 398 N.Y.S.2d
832, 835 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). Under the
Code, the implied warranty of merchantability exists only if the defendant is a
"merchant," a term defined as one in the business of selling or with some special
expertise in the goods. U.C.C. § 2-104 (1977). Thus, one who makes an occasional
sale is not considered to be a merchant within the meaning of the section. McGregor
v. Dimou, 101 Misc. 2d 756, 759-60, 422 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809-10 (Cir. Ct. 1979).
9. For the sake of brevity, these two causes of action will be referred to as "strict
liability" and "breach of warranty."
10. U.C.C. § 2-607(3) (1977).
11. Id. § 2-316.
12. Id. § 2-725.
13. The relationship created between the parties to a contract is defined as
"'privity." Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 Or. L. Rev. 119, 131 (1958).
14. See U.C.C. § 2-318 Alternative A (1977). The majority of states require some
degree of privity prior to suit. [1981] 1 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) J 4016-17. Privity is
often a condition precedent to a breach of warranty suit to recover economic loss
pursuant to a sales contract. E.g., Dudley v. Bayou Fabricators, Inc., 330 F. Supp.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
sales context, they are usually held not to be proper in a personal
injury suit by a consumer.'5 Strict liability is thus unencumbered by
them.' 6
The coexistence of these two causes of action does not pose a serious
threat to a just resolution of a personal injury claim based on products
liability as long as there is some basis for determining when each
action is appropriate. Under the traditional rule requiring privity in a
breach of warranty suit,' 7 a distinction existed that could be clearly
recognized by the jury, the bench, and the bar: Anyone proximately
injured by a product could sue in strict liability, but only buyers could
sue in breach of warranty. When the New York Legislature amended
the Uniform Commercial Code in 1975'8 to allow breach of warranty
actions by anyone who might foreseeably use, or be affected by, a
product, however, the causes of action became almost wholly duplica-
tive in the products liability context. Nevertheless, there remain dif-
ferences that are significant enough to affect the outcome without any
relation to the injury suffered or the merits of the case. At a time when
the need for a unified, coherent doctrine of products liability has been
increasingly recognized,' 9 this redundancy in the law has led to incon-
sistent, illogical, and confused results.
788, 791 (S.D. Ala. 1971); Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Zink, 273 Md. 277,
280-81, 329 A.2d 28, 30-31 (1974); Necktas v. General Motors Corp., 357 Mass. 546,
549, 259 N.E.2d 234, 235-36 (1970); Mendelson v. General Motors Corp., 105 Misc.
2d 346, 348-50, 432 N.Y.S.2d 132, 133-35 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Hupp Corp. v. Metered
Washer Serv., 256 Or. 245, 246-47, 472 P.2d 816, 817 (1970); Texas Processed
Plastics, Inc. v. Gray Enters., 592 S.W.2d 412, 415 (rex. Civ. App. 1979). But see
Western Equip. Co. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., 605 P.2d 806, 810 (Wyo, 1980)
(economic loss recovery; absent privity is permitted).
15. E.g., Caruth v. Mariani, 11 Ariz. App. 188, 192-3, 463 P.2d 83, 87 (1970);
Hawkeye See. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373, 381-82 (Iowa 1972);
Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1364-65 (Okla. 1974); Wights v.
Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Or. 301, 304, 405 P.2d 624, 626 (1965); Howes v. Hansen,
56 Wis. 2d 247, 255-57, 201 N.W.2d 825, 828-29 (1972).
16. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
17. Gimenez v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 264 N.Y. 390, 393-94, 191 N.E. 27,
28 (1934); Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 74, 161 N.E. 423, 424
(1928); Redmond v. Borden's Farm Prods. Co., 245 N.Y. 512, 512, 157 N.E. 838, 838
(1927); Chysky v. Drake Bros., 235 N.Y. 468, 472-73, 139 N.E. 576, 578 (1923).
18. Act of Aug. 9, 1975, ch. 774, 1975 N.Y. Laws 1208 (codified at N.Y.U.C.C.
§ 2-318 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981)).
19. See Model Uniform Product Liability Act introduction (Proposed Official
Draft 1979), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,714 (1979); Birnbaum, Legislative
Reform or Retreat? A Response to the Product Liability Crisis, 14 Forum 251, 252-55
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Birnbaum I]; Dickerson, Was Prosser's Folly Also Tray-
nor's? or Should the Judge's Monument be Moved to a Firmer Site?, 2 Hofstra L.
Rev. 469, 481-83 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Dickerson 1]; Epstein, Products Liabil-
ity: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C. L. Rev. 643, 648-54 (1978) [herein-
after cited as Epstein I]; James, Products Liability, 34 Tex. L. Rev. 192, 227-28
(1955); Shanker, A Case of Judicial Chutzpah (The Judicial Adoption of Strict Tort
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This Note briefly examines the development of breach of warrant)'
and strict liability, concluding that the two causes of action are nearly
identical. It then discusses how the 1975 amendment to the Code
impedes the development of products liability law in New York, and
suggests that the amendment be excised. Finally, in proposing a solu-
tion, this Note weighs the two causes of action on the scales of current
public policy and argues that this policy in New York can best be
effected through the further development of strict liability and the
elimination of breach of warranty as a cause of action for product-
related harms.
I. THE QUINTESSENTIAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY CONTESTANTS: STRICT
LIABILITY IN TORT VS. BREACH OF WARRANTY
Prosser called strict liability a "freak hybrid . . .of tort and con-
tract." 20 Insofar as such a characterization implies that strict liability
protects both substantive tort and contract rights, its validity is ques-
tionable.2' To the extent, however, that Prosser's characterization
Products Liability Theory), I1 Akron L. Rev. 697, 708-09 (1978); Titus, Restatement(Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commerical Code, 22 Stan. L. Rev.
713, 714-15 (1970).
20. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn.
L. Rev. 791, 800 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Prosser I]. "Courts extended the basis for
liability in products liability cases beyond negligence. In making the extension they
borrowed the concept and terminology of 'implied warranty. from the law of
sales ...." Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Or. 273, 285, 512 P.2d 776, 781
(1973) (Denecke, J., concurring).
21. Dean Prosser himself observes: "This duty [of a seller of goods], while it arises
out of the relation created by the contract, is not identical with the contract obliga-
tion, but is merely a part of the general responsibility, sounding in tort, which is
placed by the law upon anyone who stands in such a relation that his affirmative
conduct will affect the interests of another." W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of
Torts 632 (4th ed. 1971) (footnote omitted). Even prior to the adoption of strict
liability, courts often recognized that what they called breach of warranty in a
non-privity situation was in fact a new tort action. Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps,
139 Tex. 609, 612, 164 S.W.2d 828, 829 (1942). "Liability in such a case is not based
on negligence, nor on a breach of the usual implied contractual warranty, but on the
broad principle of the public policy to protect human health and life.'" Id. Histori-
cally, implied warranty arose solely as a means to assure that the buyer of goods
received his bargain, evolving primarily through the "law merchant," a specialized
body of law dealing with commercial practices of the marketplace in England in the
Middle Ages. C. Rembar, The Law of the Land 70 (1980). The warranty was
implied in the sense that the parties understood that the goods be of a certain quality
even if the contract did not define the level of quality. In Gardiner v. Cray, 171 Eng.
Rep. 46 (K.B. 1815), the court reasoned that the purchaser "cannot without [express]
warranty insist that [the item purchased] be of any particular quality or fineness, but
the intention of both parties must be taken to be, that it shall be saleable in the
market under the denomination mentioned in the contract between them. The
purchaser cannot be supposed to buy goods to lay them on a dunghill." Id. at 47:
accord Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 169, 317 P.2d 1094,
1097 (1957); Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 72-73, 269 P.2d 413. 416-17
1981]
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describes the historical development of strict liability, it is accurate.
Prior to the move toward strict liability in the 1960's, courts around
the country, confronted with a typical product defect situation in
which the defendant could not be proven negligent, characterized the
action as breach of warranty and allowed the plaintiff to state a
claim, whether or not he was in privity with the defendant. 22  The
(1954); 2 A. Pearson & H. Fenwick, Benjamin's Treatise on the Law of Sale of
Personal Property 938, 958-59 (3d ed. 1888). When plaintiff seeks redress under strict
liability for personal injury caused by a product, the presence or absence of a
contract is irrelevant. Langford v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 373 F. Supp. 1251, 1254
(E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 513 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1975); O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103
Ariz. 556, 559, 447 P.2d 248, 251 (1968); Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse Automo-
tive Air Brake Co., 33 Colo. App. 99, 108, 517 P.2d 406, 411-12 (1973); Center
Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ca. 868, 868, 218 S.E.2d 580, 581 (1975); John R. Dudley
Constr. Inc. v. Drott Mfg. Co., 66 A.D.2d 368, 371, 412 N.Y.S.2d 512, 514 (1979);
Steckmar Nat'l Realty & Inv. Corp. v. J I Case Co., 99 Misc. 2d 212, 214, 415
N.Y.S.2d 946, 948 (Sup. Ct. 1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
Moreover, some courts have characterized the plaintiff's action as seeking consequen-
tial damages instead of enforcing the bargain. Anglo E. Bulkships Ltd. v. Ameron,
Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1212, 1213 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews
Co., 190 Neb. 546, 561-63, 209 N.W.2d 643, 653 (1973); Milau Assoc. v. North Ave.
Dev. Corp., 42 N.Y.2d 482, 488-89, 368 N.E.2d 1247, 1251, 398 N.Y.S.2d 882, 886
(1977). Similarly, strict liability is rarely allowed as a means to recover for economic
loss. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 16-19, 403 P.2d 145, 150-52, 45
Cal. Rptr. 17, 22-24 (1965). But see Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Elgood Mayo Corp.,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 19, 1980, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 15, 1980), afJ'd, 81 A.D.2d 221,
439 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1981). The Schiavone decision extends the holding of John R.
Dudley Constr., Inc. v. Drott Mfg. Co., 66 A.D.2d 368, 412 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1979), in
which a strict liability action was allowed when the only harm was to the product
itself. Id. at 372, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 514. The basis for such decisions may be the
potentially expanded scope of strict liability implicit in Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d
330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973), in which the Court held that a cause
of action in strict liability is available to those incurring "injury or damages." Id. at
342, 298 N.E.2d at 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 470 (emphasis added). But economic loss
cannot be recovered under the Code absent privity. Mendelson v. General Motors
Corp., 105 Misc. 2d 3,46, 348-50, 432 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134-35 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
22. E.g., Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445, 451 (3d Cir. 1946); Vac-
carezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 689-90, 163 P.2d 470, 472 (1945);
Naumann v. Wehle Brewing Co., 127 Conn. 44, 46-47, 15 A.2d 181, 181-82 (1940);
Nemela v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 104 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Mo. App. 1937); McSpe-
don v. Kunz, 271 N.Y. 131, 136-37, 2 N.E.2d 513, 514-15 (1936). Other courts
allowed recovery either without specifically describing the cause of action or describ-
ing it as a form of negligence. E.g., Lynch v. International Harvester Co., 60 F.2d
223, 224 (10th Cir. 1932); Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Columbus McKin-
non Chain Co., 13 F.2d 128, 128 (W.D.N.Y. 1926); Roettig v. Westinghouse Elec. &
Mfg. Co., 53 F. Supp. 588, 590-92 (E.D. Mo. 1944); see Jefferson Standard Life Ins.
Co. v. Watson, 242 Ala. 181, 183-84, 5 So. 2d 639, 641 (1942). However, in the
nineteenth century the doctrine of caveat emptor often precluded warranty suits even
by those in privity when the buyer had an opportunity to inspect the product. See
Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. 383, 388-89 (1870); Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim
Caveat Emptor, 40 Yale L.J. 1133, 1160 (1931).
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characteristics of a warranty action made it most suitable for remedy-
ing product-caused harms: Culpability was irrelevant 3 (warranty lia-
bility thus was "strict"); the harm involved defective goods;2 and for
liability to attach, the defendant must have been a merchant.2
The application of a breach of warranty theory when the plaintiff
was not a buyer, however, created conceptual problems because tra-
ditionally, without a contractual relationship-privity20-- between
the plaintiff and defendant, there could be no sales warranty suit.2 7
Thus, when a buyer was injured, he could sue his immediate seller for
the harm. 28 Should a non-buyer sue any seller, or a buyer sue a seller
from whom he had not directly purchased the product, however, the
privity "citadel" had precluded recovery.29  Recognition that this
developing cause of action was not a true sales warranty but a new
23. W. Prosser, supra note 21, at 636.
24. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1977) ("Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article
applies to transactions in goods .... "). "Goods" include all things movable at the
time of identification, excluding money in which the price is to be paid, investment
securities, and choses in action. Id. § 2-105(1).
25. A merchant is one who deals in goods of the kind involved in the sale, who
represents himself as having specialized skill or knowledge with respect to such goods,
or employs one who does. Id. § 2-104(1). A merchant seller can be a corporation or
other business entity. Id. §§ 1-201(28), (30), 2-104. Under the Restatement version of
strict liability, the defendant can be liable only if he is in the business of selling.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
26. See supra note 13. A distinction is usually drawn between vertical and
horizontal privity. W. Keeton, D. Owen & J. Montgomery, Products Liability and
Safety 136 (1980). True vertical privity exists only between a purchaser and the
person from whom he bought the goods. Thus, when an injured consumer, who has
purchased from a retailer, seeks to sue the manufacturer for breach of warranty, the
suit will be barred in those jurisdictions following the rule requiring vertical pri'ity.
See Mendelson v. General Motors Corp., 105 Misc. 2d 346, 352, 432 N.Y.S.2d 132,
136 (Sup. Ct. 1980). Horizontal privity, on the other hand, seeks to determine to
which parties, in some relationship with the buyer, the warranties given by the seller
extend. W. Keeton, D. Owen & J. Montgomery, supra, at 136. Those jurisdictions
recognizing a broad concept of horizontal privity will allow the suit on the ground
that the plaintiff, by virtue of his relationship with the buyer, was in privity with
him and received the same warranty of merchantability. The plaintiff in such a case
is deemed to stand in the shoes of the buyer. Most jurisdictions hold that horizontal
privity exists among family members and between purchasers and those living in
their households. [19811 1 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 4017. See generally Salvador v.
Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974).
27. Gimenez v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 264 N.Y. 390, 393, 191 N.E. 27, 28
(1934); Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 74, 161 N.E. 423, 424
(1928); Redmond v. Borden's Farm Prods. Co., 245 N.Y. 512, 512, 157 N.E. 838, 838
(1927); Chysky v. Drake Bros., 235 N.Y. 468, 472, 139 N.E. 576, 578 (1923).
28. Hoover v. Peters, 18 Mich. 50, 54-55 (1869).
29. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
Yale L.J. 1099, 1110-11 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser II]. Dean Prosser charac-
terized the privity requirement as a citadel because it was an insurmountable obsta-
cle to recovery by remote consumers who were unable to prove negligence on the part
1981]
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tort action might have solved the problem. Judge Cardozo's 1916MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 30 decision eliminated the require-
ment of privity in negligence suits for product-caused harms.31 It
could have been argued, therefore, that because this "breach of war-
ranty" suit was in essence a tort-based action, privity was not a
necessary element. Yet rather than adopt such an approach, courts
retained the "language technic" 32 of breach of warranty 3 and
chipped away at the privity requirement, eliminating it in areas offood, 34 then products related to the body, 35 then all products.3 0  By
of the manufacturer. Because a warranty action was possible only when there wasprivity between the parties, such consumers were, therefore, precluded from any
remedy. Id.; see Prosser I, supra note 20, at 800.
30. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).31. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053. The existence of the privity requirement in tortactions can be traced to Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842), inwhich the court held that, absent privity, there could be no contract-based action formisfeasance. Id. at 403. However, the decision was misinterpreted by later courts asholding that no tort liability was possible in the absence of privity. W. Keeton, D.Owen & J. Montgomery, supra note 26, at 42; W. Prosser, supra note 21, at 622.32. The phrase "language technic" means the use of well-known words andphrases to describe and apply legal doctrine. Green, The Duty Problem in NegligenceCases, 28 Colum. L. Rev. 1014, 1016-19 (1928). Dean Green described the basicdichotomy, recognized by legal realist philosophers, between the words a court usesto explain its actions and how the court actually leaves the parties after trial or
appellate review. By adhering to a familiar language technic, but deciding the caseon a basis essentially different from that which the technic describes, courts mayproduce just results in a given case. This process, however, leads to tension andconfusion as future courts and the bar try to reconcile the conflict. Id. Professor Kielyhas applied Dean Green's theory to the approach of Karl Llewellyn, the moving forcebehind much of the Code, in analyzing recent developments in strict productsliability. Professor Kiely notes that a current "crisis of confidence" (Llewellyn'sphrase) has resulted from the differences between the language technic of the SecondRestatement § 402A and the philosophy underlying strict liability for products. Kiely,The Art of the Neglected Obvious in Products Liability Cases: Some Thoughts onLlewellyn's The Common Law Tradition, 24 De Paul L. Rev. 914, 914-19 (1975).33. See, e.g., Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 788, 176 N.W.382, 388-90 (1920); Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 825, 18 P.2d 199, 201 (1933),
overruled on other grounds, Bereman v. Burdolski, 204 Kan. 162, 170, 460 P.2d 567,573 (1969) (allowing the defense of contributory negligence that Challis had refused);Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 616-17, 164 S.W.2d 828, 831-32(1942); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 626, 135 P. 633, 634 (1913).34. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 630, 135 P. 633, 636 (1913); see H.Melick, The Sale of Food and Drink 10 (1936). See generally Perkins, UnwholesomeFood as a Source of Liability, 5 Iowa L. Bull. 6 (1919).35. Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 74, 269 P.2d 413, 418 (1954);Worley v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 1119, 253 S.W.2d 532,536 (1952); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 246-47, 147N.E.2d 612, 614 (1958).36. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120,134-35, 90 N.W.2d 873, 880-81 (1958); see Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d
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the early 1960's, however, most courts recognized that what they
called breach of warranty was essentially a tort cause of action to be
used when existing tort mechanisms, such as negligence, were un-
available to the plaintiff. 37
The distinction between the sales law warranty and the tort-based
warranty causes of action was clearly delineated in the 1960 New
Jersey decision of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,3s but it was
not until California's 1963 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.m
that the tort cause of action broke free from the language of warranty
and was termed strict liability. 40 The Second Restatement of Torts,
published two years after Greenman, included a newv section 402A, 4'
which is in accord with the Greenman holding. 42  Courts around the
country followed the leads of California and the Restatement in ac-
cepting strict liability, 43 although some retained the older name of
warranty in tort or common-law warranty. 44 The Restatement, in
fact, recognized the possibility that such terms would be retained, but
124, 129-30 (2d Cir. 1963); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501, 504
(10th Cir. 1959); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 412-16, 161
A.2d 69, 99-101 (1960); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432,
436-37, 191 N.E.2d 81, 82-83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594-95 (1963).
37. S. Speiser, Lawsuit 308-09 (1980).
38. 32 N.J. 358, 412-15, 161 A.2d 69, 99-101 (1960).
39. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
40. Justice Traynor's majority opinion stated: "A manufacturer is strictly liable
in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."
Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
41. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965); see supra note 1. The original
Restatement had no provision for strict products liability. Section 402A of the Second
Restatement has an unusual history; its tentative versions paralleled the general
development of strict products liability law. The sixth Tentative Draft, in 1961,
proposed strict liability for food and similar products. The seventh Tentative Draft,
in 1962, expanded the section to include products intended for intimate bodily use.
The Final Draft, in 1964, eliminated all such qualifications and extended the protec-
tion offered by the section to all products. Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d
911, 918-19 (5th Cir. 1964).
42. See supra note 40. The essential difference is that the Restatement version
requires a showing that the product is both defective and unreasonably dangerous,
while the Greenman formulation speaks only of defect. See supra note 1. California
subsequently chose not to include the "unreasonably dangerous" qualification in its
strict liability doctrine. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132-33, 501
P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972) (en bane).
43. E.g., Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 289-90, 216 A.2d 189, 192 (1965);
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 619, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965); Dealers
Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441, 446-47 (Ky. 1965); Wights v.
Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Or. 301, 310-11, 405 P.2d 624, 629 (1965).
44. Lee v. Wright Tool & Forge Co., 48 Ohio App. 2d 148, 152, 356 N.E.2d 303,
306 (1975); Avenell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 156, 324
N.E.2d 583, 587 (1974); Logan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 216 Va. 425, 427-28,
219 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1975).
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warned that this "warranty" was to be distinguished from a sales law
remedy. 45
The development of strict liability in New York roughly followed
this pattern. Damages for personal injury had long been recoverable
in breach of warranty actions. 46  Yet it was not until 1961, with
Greenberg v. Lorenz,47 that the Court of Appeals broadly held that
privity was not required in a breach of warranty suit for personal
injury.48 In 1963, ironically the same year as Greenman 40 in Califor-
nia, the Court of Appeals was given the opportunity to break free of
the language technic of warranty and to adopt strict tort. In Goldberg
v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,50 however, the court retained the
breach of warranty language, although it recognized that this was
essentially the same action that Greenman had labeled strict tort..5
New York products liability law was complicated in 1964, when the
Uniform Commercial Code became effective.. 2 This legislation codi-
fied the existing sales law warranty action and included recovery for
personal injury and property damage, formerly the province of the
common-law warranty recognized in Goldberg..3 Thus, by statute,
suits brought under the rubric of breach of warranty were to be
governed by the Code, which established a number of limitations not
previously recognized in the common-law warranty action. Some
privity was required: Only the buyer or his family members or guests
could sue. 4  Additionally, a seller could disclaim all warranties-
even the warranty of merchantability, 55 the basis for most personal
injury suits under the Code. The plaintiff, moreover, was required to
give timely notice of the breach or else be barred from any Code
45. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment m (1965) ("There is nothing
in this Section which would prevent any court from treating the rule stated as a
matter of 'warranty' to the user or consumer. But if this is done, it should be
recognized and understood that the 'warranty' is a very different kind of warranty
from those usually found in the sale of goods .... ").
46. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436-37, 191 N.E.2d
81, 82-83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594-95 (1963). Earlier decisions had permitted actions
for harms caused by negligently made products. E.g., General Accident, Fire & Life
Assurance Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 132 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1942);
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
47. 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
48. Id. at 200, 173 N.E.2d at 775-76, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 42-43.
49. See supra notes 39-40.
50. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
51. Id. at 436-37, 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 594-95.
52. Uniform Commercial Code, ch. 553, 1962 N.Y. Laws 1687 (codified at
N.Y.U.C.C. §§ 1-101 to 10-105 (McKinney 1964)).
53. See supra note 46.
54. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney 1964).
55. Id. § 2-316(2).
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remedy.5 6 Finally, the Code's statute of limitations began to run
upon the date of the product's tender,5 not the plaintiff's injury.
Thus, if the harm occurred more than the statutory period of four
years from the date of tender, the plaintiff was barred from any
action under the Code.
Despite the clear statutory language, New York courts were not
prepared to hold plaintiffs in personal injury suits to standards appli-
cable to business dealings. Recovery would not be denied solely be-
cause the Code elements were not satisfied. Faced with defendants'
assertions that the Code required privity for a breach of warranty
action, for instance, some courts allowed the plaintiff to state a claim
on the basis of the official comments to section 2-318 of the Code:
"[T]he section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the
developing case law on whether the seller's warranties ... extend to
other persons in the distributive chain." 58  Similarly, courts deter-
mined that holding an injured plaintiff to a timely notice requirement
would have precluded recovery and thus was contrary to the public
policy of redressing product-caused harms. 59 Furthermore, courts
held that the statute of limitations for a breach of warranty cause of
action accrued on injury, not upon tender as the Code provided.60 In
so avoiding the Code requirements, courts were essentially basing
their decisions on the proposition that what was called breach of
warranty was actually another cause of action altogether: a tortious
action similar to the strict liability then being applied in other states. 61
56. Id. § 2-607(3).
57. Id. § 2-725.
58. Id. § 2-318 official comment 3; see Robert T. Donaldson Inc. v. Aggregate
Surfacing Corp., 47 A.D.2d 852, 852, 366 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195-96 (1975); Ciampichini
v. Ring Bros., 40 A.D.2d 289, 292, 339 N.Y.S.2d 716, 719-20 (1973); Pimm v.
Graybar Elec. Co., 27 A.D.2d 309, 310-11, 278 N.Y.S.2d 913, 915 (1967).
59. E.g., Fischer v. Mead Johnson Laboratories, 41 A.D.2d 737, 737, 341
N.Y.S.2d 257, 258 (1973).
60. E.g., Infante v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 49 A.D.2d 72, 74-75, 371
N.Y.S.2d 500, 502 (1975).
61. The Code specifically allows disclaimers of warranties, N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-
316(2) (McKinney 1964), but unlike notice and privity, the enforcement of dis-
claimers was never a major issue in New York products liability suits brought prior to
the adoption of strict liability. The one Court of Appeals case to discuss the applica-
bility of disclaimers, Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305
N.E.2d 750, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1973), sidestepped the issue by holding that the
injured parties had not seen the disclaimers in question. Id. at 124-25, 305 N.E.2d at
754, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 623. Because disclaimers are a part of the contract, the Code's
proscription against unconscionable clauses allows courts to nullify any disclaimers
that avoid liability for personal injury. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-302 (McKinney 1964). More-
over, to be successful disclaimers must meet specific formal requirements. Id. § 2-
316(2). It should be noted, too, that limitations on remedies with respect to personal
injury are prima faie unconscionable. Id. § 2-719(3).
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Finally, in 1973, ten years after Greenman,62 the Court of Appeals
adopted strict liability in Codling v. Paglia.3 This doctrine, similar
to section 402A of the Restatement, 64 holds the manufacturer strictly
liable to any person injured by a product if the defect was a substan-
tial factor in bringing about the injury. 5 Because the common-law
warranty action had now developed into a full-fledged strict liability
cause of action, courts after Codling could differentiate between strict
tort liability and breach of warranty. 6  They accordingly indicated
that all the privity and procedural requirements of the Code should be
applied to warranty actions.6 7  In 1975, however, the legislature
expanded the availability of the breach of warranty action to all those
who could foreseeably be affected by the product," thus once again
blurring the lines between the actions.
The vehicle for this expansion was the 1966 amendment of the
official version of the Code, prompted by the nonuniform alteration
of the privity requirement by some states.69 This alteration had
occurred when courts permitted suits by non-purchasers who would
otherwise be left without a remedy. 70 The amendment provided for
three alternative ways of extending warranty protection beyond the
62. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963).
63. 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973). The court held
that a manufacturer of a defective product is liable to any person injured or damaged
if the defect was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's harm, if the product
was being used for an intended purpose at the time of the accident, and if the
plaintiff was not contributorily negligent or could not otherwise have averted his
harm. Id. at 342-43, 298 N.E.2d at 628-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 469-70.
64. See supra note 1.
65. See supra note (33.
66. The Court of Appeals has recognized that strict liability is a tort- not a
warranty-based doctrine. Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 385-86, 348 N.E.2d
571, 576-78, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 120-21 (1976).
67. The Court of Appeals has stated that privity is required in a warranty suit,
Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 591-92, 374 N.E.2d 97, 100, 403
N.Y.S.2d 185, 189 (1978), that disclaimers of warranty may be given effect, Velez v.
Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 124-25, 305 N.E.2d 750, 754, 350
N.Y.S.2d 617, 622-23 (1973) (dictum), and that the statute of limitations accrues
upon tender, not upon injury. Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d
395, 402-03, 335 N.E.2d 275, 278-79, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 43-44 (1975) (dictum).
68. Act of Aug. 9, 1975, ch. 774, 1975 N.Y. Laws 1208 (codified at N.Y.U.C.C.
§ 2-318 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981)).
69. Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Report No.
3, at x (Dec. 15, 1966), reprinted in ALI and Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on
Uniform State Laws, Uniform Commercial Code XXXIII, XXXIV (9th ed. 1978).
70. E.g., Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 1963); Gold-
berg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436-37, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592, 594-95 (1963); see Cillam, supra note 13. at 152-55; Prosser II, supra
note 29, at 1110-11.
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buyer.7'1 Alternative A is the original section 2-318 72 in effect in New
York until 1975.73 It extends warranty protection to family members
and guests in the home who suffer personal injury.74  Alternative B
extends warranty coverage to anyone who could reasonably be ex-
pected to use or be affected by the product and who suffers personal
injury.75 Alternative C differs from B primarily in that it is not
limited to personal injury.76 Alternatives B and C are the means by
71. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1977).
72. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1962) (amended 1966).
73. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney 1964).
74. Id. The text reads in full: "A seller's warranty whether express or implied
extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is
a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or
be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A
seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section." Id.
75. U.C.C. § 2-318 Alternative B (1977). The text reads in full: "A seller's
warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who may reason-
ably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in
person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of
this section." Id. New York's version is slightly different, though apparently identical
in substance: "A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected
by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may
not exclude or limit the operation of this section." N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney
Supp. 1980-1981). It should be noted that states with Alternative A or B relax the
privity requirement only in personal injury cases; in economic loss cases the require-
ment still exists. See Potsdam Welding & Mach. Co. v. Neptune Microfloc, Inc., 57
A.D.2d 993, 995, 394 N.Y.S.2d 744, 746 (1977); Mendelson v. General Motors
Corp., 105 Misc. 2d 346, 348-49, 432 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (Sup. Ct. 1980). Although
Alternative B is generally considered an expansion of warranty protection, in Martin
v. Drackett Prods. Co., 100 Misc. 2d 728, 420 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup. Ct. 1979), the
court came to the curious conclusion that the amendment represents a partial con-
traction of seller's liability. It would, therefore, not allow the purchaser's child to
recover under Alternative B, for example, because the child was not a foreseeable
user. Id. at 732, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 150. The court reasoned that, by removing the
references to beneficiaries specified in Alternative A, the legislature intended to
restrict the warranty protection. Id. at 730-31, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 149. This analysis is
questionable, however, because a child, as a family member of the purchaser, could
reasonably be anticipated to be affected by the product.
76. U.C.C. § 2-318 Alternative C (1977). The text reads in full: "A sellers
warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may reasonably be
expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of
the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section with
respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends." Id.;
see Report No. 3, supra note 69, at x, reprinted in ALI and Nat'l Conference of
Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Commercial Code at XXXIV. Slightly
more than one-half of the states have adopted Alternative A, with the remainder
equally divided among Alternative B, Alternative C and specialized versions. [1981]
1 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 4017; see T. Quinn, Uniform Commercial Code Com-
mentary and Law Digest 2-318[A] (1978 & Supp. 1979). Because Alternative A
permits suits only by a party in a specified relation with the buyer, some states have
further modified their statutes to allow recovery against prior sellers in the chain of
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which states can officially use the Code as a form of surrogate strict
liability. 77 The Code's official comments clearly imply that the Alter-
natives were an attempt to move the Code closer to the strict liability
doctrine expressed in section 402A of the Restatement. 78
It is not surprising, therefore, that Alternatives B and C were
adopted by those states that either had rejected strict liability in favor
of breach of warranty 79 or had used breach of warranty as a form of
strict liability before adopting the latter doctrine.80 The New York
Legislature's 1975 adoption of Alternative B, 81 then, was particularly
curious since it came two years after the Court of Appeals had
adopted strict products liability in Codling. Adding to this mystery is
the scant legislative history that set forth the purpose of the amend-
ment: to provide a remedy for injured recipients of gifts.82  Such a
measure was, however, unnecessary: Because the state had already
adopted strict liability, an injured recipient of a defective gift would
not be precluded from a remedy due to his lack of privity. If pre-
vented from suing for breach of warranty for any reason, he would
still have a strict liability cause of action. 83 Thus, presently in New
distribution. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 85-2-318.2 (Supp. 1981); Va. Code §
8.2-318 (1965). California has not adopted any version of the section. In Texas, the
legislature left to the courts the question whether warranty actions could be main-
tained by those not in privity. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. tit. 1, § 2.318 (Vernon
1968). Additionally, Alternative B allows only natural persons to bring suit, while
Alternative C permits any person, including organizations, to bring a cause of action
in breach of warranty. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1977).
77. See, e.g., Wilhelm v. Globe Solvent Co., 373 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. Super.
Ct.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 411 A.2d 611 (Del. 1977); Back v. Wickes Corp.,
378 N.E.2d 964, 968-69 (Mass. 1978).
78. U.C.C. § 2-318 official comment 3 (1977).
79. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2-318 (1975). Delaware has adopted strict
liability only for leases and bailments, not for sales of goods. Cline v. Prowler Indus.,
418 A.2d 968, 971, 980 (Del. 1980).
80. Kansas, which enacted Alternative B in 1967, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 84-2-318
(Supp. 1980), adopted in 1976 the strict liability doctrine as set forth in the Second
Restatement § 402A. Brooks v. Dietz, 218 Kan. 698, 702, 545 P.2d 1104, 1108 (1976).
81. Act of Aug. 9, 1975, ch. 774, 1975 N.Y. Laws 1208 (codified at N.Y.U.C.C.
§ 2-318 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981)).
82. Memorandum of Assemblyman Leonard Silverman, 1975 New York State
Legislative Annual 110.
83. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461, 469-70 (1973) (strict products liability applies to any user, consumer,
or bystander). See generally Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 403
N.E.2d 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348
N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976). In Atkinson v. Ormont Mach. Co., 102 Misc.
2d 468, 423 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup. Ct. 1979), the court gave full effect to Alternative B
and allowed a suit by an employee of the purchaser. Id. at 470-71, 423 N.Y.S.2d at
579-80. The court implied that the statutory provision was necessary in discussing the
"'sad plight of the innocent victim with no form of redress or available relief,"
occasioned by the traditional requirement of privity in a products liability suit. Id. at
470, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 579. Although the court was bound to apply the statute, Its
characterization of the plaintiff as helpless was incorrect because, with the advent of
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York, a party who suffers personal injury as a result of a defective
product may sue in strict tort as well as in breach of warranty even
though the plaintiff neither purchased the product from the seller, nor
has any other relation to the seller or the buyer."4
II. THE SIMILARITY OF THE DOCTRINES
Courts in most states hold that strict liability and breach of war-
ranty are very similar, if not identical.8 5  Only the privity require-
ment,8 6 the several procedural aspects of warranty,87 and a potentially
different standard of liability differentiate the two. In New York, the
1975 amendment to section 2-318 eliminated the privity require-
ment.88 Of the remaining differences, however, two might result in a
different outcome in certain circumstances. The first is the standard of
liability, that is, the level of defectiveness the plaintiff is required to
prove. The second is the major procedural distinction, the statute of
limitations, which is different in each cause of action.8 9
strict liability, no plaintiff is precluded from relief on the grounds of absence of
privity.
84. Cerrato v. R.H. Crown Co., 58 A.D.2d 721, 721, 396 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717
(1977); Potsdam Welding & Mach. Co. v. Neptune Microfloc, Inc., 57 A.D.2d 993,
994-95, 394 N.Y.S.2d 744, 746 (1977).
85. E.g., Hornungv. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 183, 184 (D. Mont.
1970); Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 326-28 (Alaska 1970); Sansing v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 354 So. 2d 895, 897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Fisher v. Gate
City Steel Corp., 190 Neb. 699, 703, 211 N.V.2d 914, 917 (1973); Pearson v.
Franklin Laboratories, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 133, 139 (S.D. 1977); see Wilhelm v. Globe
Solvent Co., 373 A.2d 218, 222-23 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977); Parish v. B.F. Goodrich
Co., 395 Mich. 271, 278-82, 235 N.W.2d 570, 573-75 (1975).
86. See supra note 13.
87. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 75.
89. Other procedural distinctions between strict tort and breach of warranty
include the allocation of the burden of proof and the choice of applicable law. Their
effect on outcome has been minimal, however, because they are rarely litigated.
Under the Code, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the breach. N.Y.U.C.C. §
2-607(4) (McKinney 1964). Although the plaintiff also has the burden of proving a
defect unreasonably dangerous in strict liability cases, a recent line of cases has
introduced a two-prong test in design defect litigation, shifting the burden to the
defendant to prove reasonable safety. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d
871, 885 (Alaska 1979); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431-32, 573 P.2d
443, 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237-38 (1978). On the choice of law issue, see
Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., 425 F. Supp. 81 (D. Conn. 1977), aff'd on
rehearing, 505 F. Supp. 1094 (D. Conn. 1981). In Quadrini, the court heard a
wrongful death action in which the decedent was killed in a helicopter crash in North
Carolina, a state that does not recognize strict liability. Id. at 88-89. The district
court dismissed the strict liability claim because, as a tort action, it accrued in the
state of the accident, where strict liability was not available. Id. The warranty action
was upheld, however, because the substantive law to be applied was that of Connect-
icut, the place of contracting (where the helicopter was tendered), and that state
recognized a breach of warranty cause of action. Id. at 90-91. Thus, treating war-
ranty cases under the Code as tort cases, as suggested in Martin v. Julius Dierck
Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 591-92, 374 N.E.2d 97, 101-02, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185,
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Some New York courts have held the plaintiff to a higher showing
of proof in a strict liability action compared with the proof required in
a warranty action. When the plaintiff sues for breach of warranty, he
is required to show that the product is "unmerchantable." 00  This
level of quality is usually considered to be the same as "defective." 0'
189-90 (1978), might result in inequities to either party as a result of the allocation of
the burden of proof or the selection of applicable law according to tort principles.
This danger is increased by the amendment to § 2-318, which eliminates any clear
distinction between the two actions. In some states, other reasons exist for maintain-
ing breach of warranty separate from strict liability. See Allen v. Parsons, 555
S.W.2d 522, 523 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (successful breach of warranty suit under
Code allows recovery of treble damages and attorney's fees under state consumer
protection statute). Generally, the same remedies are available in either action, and
full recovery is allowed for personal injury in a warranty action. See, e.g., Titlebaum
v. Loblaws, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 985, 986, 429 N.Y.S.2d 91, 93 (1980); McCarthy v.
Bristol Laboratories, 61 A.D.2d 196, 201-02, 401 N.Y.S.2d 509, 513 (1978); Atkinson
v. Ormont Mach. Co., 102 Misc. 2d 468, 469-71, 423 N.Y.S.2d 577, 579-80 (Sup. Ct.
1979); Martin v. Drackett Prods. Co., 100 Misc. 2d 728, 730-33, 420 N.Y.S.2d 147,
149-50 (Sup. Ct. 1979). Although there has been some debate as to whether emo-
tional distress recovery should be allowed in a warranty action, this appears to stem
from a general reluctance to allow damages not readily verifiable. Thus, when
physical injury accompanies the distress, courts often uphold emotional distress
awards. See Kroger Co. v. Beck, 375 N.E.2d 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) recovery for
loss of enjoyment of food allowed following injury by hypodermic needle in steak).
Even when no injury occurs, however, courts occasionally allow recovery, provided
there is explicit proof of the manifestations of such emotional distress. Lemaldi v. Do
Tomaso of Am., Inc., 156 N.J. Super. 441, 383 A.2d 1220 (Law Div. 1978) (plain-
tiff's expensive sports car so defective that emotional distress recovery would have
been allowed on sufficient showing of distress). Punitive damages are recoverable
under strict liability, Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976), but not usually under the Code, which precludes "penal
damages . . . except as specifically provided [by the Code] or by other rule of law."
N.Y.U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (McKinney 1964). See generally Owen, Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Litigation, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1258 (1976). A derivative action
brought by a spouse for loss of consortium has been allowed in a Code warranty
breach suit. See McCarthy v. Bristol Laboratories, 61 A.D.2d 196, 198, 401 N.Y.S.2d
509, 511 (1978).
90. Under the Code, the seller warrants that the product is merchantable, which
is in turn defined as, among other qualities, "fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used." N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (MeKinney 1964); see Finkelstein v.
Chevron Chem. Co., 60 A.D.2d 640, 641, 400 N.Y.S.2d 548, 549 (1977); Schwartz v.
Macrose Lumber & Trim Co., 50 Misc. 2d 547, 551-53, 270 N.Y.S.2d 875, 882-83
(Sup. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 29 A.D.2d 781, 287 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1968),
ajf'd, 24 N.Y.2d 856, 248 N.E.2d 920, 301 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1969); United States Leasing
Corp. v. Comerald Assoc., 101 Misc. 2d 773, 777, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 1005 (Civ. Ct.
1979).
91. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 7, at 355-56 (apart from "unreasonably
dangerous," both standards are the same); Dickerson I, supra note 19, at 478 ("un-
merchantable" equals legally defective). Implied warranty does not impose a no-
fault type of liability even though some courts appear to have held it does. "When
machinery 'malfunctions', it obviously lacks fitness regardless of the cause of the
malfunction. Under the theory of warranty, the 'sin' is the lack of fitness as evidenced
by the malfunction itself rather than some specific dereliction by the manufacturer in
constructing or designing the machinery." Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'g Co., 283 F.
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When the plaintiff sues in strict tort, he must prove the product
Supp. 978, 982 (W.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969); accord Krause v.
Sud-Aviation, Societe Nationale de Constructions Aeronautiques, 301 F. Supp. 513,
524 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 413 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1969). However, such broad
statements regarding warranty liability are misleading. A distinction must be drawn
between express warranties, in which the liability is absolute, and implied warran-
ties, in which the analysis is usually objective. Breach of an express warranty imposes
absolute liability in the sense that the breaching party's culpability is irrelevant. To
make out a case, the plaintiff need merely show that the product as delivered differs
from the product as warranted. U.C.C. §§ 2-313, -714 (1977); see McCarty v. E.J.
Korvette, Inc., 28 Md. App. 421, 437-38, 347 A.2d 2953, 264 (1975); Collins v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 64 N.J. 260, 261-63, 315 A.2d 16, 17-18 (1974). In an implied
warranty situation, however, the criteria against which a product is to be measured
in order to determine its merchantability are vague and objective: If the product is
generally fit and within tolerances accepted by the trade even if not in perfect
condition, the warranty has not been breached. Nassau Suffolk White Trucks, Inc. v.
Twin County Transit Mix Corp., 62 A.D.2d 982, 983-84, 403 N.Y.S.2d 322, 3-5
(1978); see U.C.C. § 2-314(2) (1977). In Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375
Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965), the court observed: "Some quibbler may allege
that this is liability without fault. It is not .... [A] plaintiff relying upon the rule
must prove a defect attributable to the manufacturer and causal connection between
that defect and the injury or damage of which he complains. . . . [Tihen and only
then may he recover against the manufacturer of the defective product." Id. at
98-99, 133 N.W.2d at 135. Moreover, the plaintiff must show the deviation from the
standard is substantial. See id. at 97-99, 133 N.WV.2d at 134-35; Nassau Suffolk
White Trucks, Inc. v. Twin County Transit Mix Corp., 62 A.D.2d 982, 983-84, 403
N.Y.S.2d 322, 324-25 (1978); Portnoy v. Capobianco, 77 Misc. 2d 817, 819-20, 355
N.Y.S.2d 86, 88 (Sup. Ct. 1974). Therefore, mere failure to perform as hoped is not
necessarily a breach of the warranty under § 2-314. Sam's Marine Park Enters. v.
Admar Bar & Kitchen Equip. Corp., 103 Misc. 2d 276, 277-78, 42-5 N.Y.S.2d 743,
744-45 (Civ. Ct. 1980); see Becton v. Firestone Tire Co., 38 A.D. 693, 693, 327
N.Y.S.2d 965, 965-66 (1972). The use of comparative fault principles can further
limit a defendant's liability. Although some courts do not allow the defense of
contributory negligence or comparative fault in a warranty action, Holt v. Stihl,
Inc., 449 F. Supp. 693, 695 (E.D. Tenn. 1977), New York's comparative fault statute
applies to such actions. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 1411 (McKinney 1976). A second
distinction is important in analyzing the threshold of liability in a warranty action-
the type of defect. Warranty liability can be said to approach absolute liability when
the defect complained of is a "unit" or "manufacturing" defect, as opposed to a
design defect. A unit defect is a condition that is contrary to the manufacturer's own
intentions and specifications (e.g., a wheel assembly missing a bolt); a design defect is
a feature of the product that conforms with the manufacturer's specifications, yet
nonetheless renders the product dangerous. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for De-
sign Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33
Vand. L. Rev. 593, 599 n.27 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Birnbaum II]; see W.
Keeton, D. Owen & J. Montgomery, supra note 26, at 270. Thus, to prove a unit
defect the plaintiff will prevail merely upon showing that the product deviated from
the manufacturer's other, non-defective products and that the defect was a proximate
cause of the injury. See Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'g Co., 283 F. Supp. 978, 982 (W.D.
Pa. 1967), aff'd, 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969); Titlebaum v. Loblaws, Inc., 75 A.D.2d
985, 985-86, 429 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92-93 (1980). On the other hand, if the defect is a
design defect, the plaintiff has no existing, non-defective product against which to
measure the harm-producing item and so must engage in a showing of what amounts
to negligence, by comparing the defendant's conduct in designing, labelling, selling,
or attaching warnings with that of a reasonably prudent manufacturer. Jones v.
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defective, 92 but he may also be required to show that the product is
unreasonably dangerous, or some variation of that language. 3 Al-
though this extra burden in strict liability actions is not imposed by all
courts and in fact is not required by Codling,94 other courts, possibly
following the Restatement formulation, have nevertheless defined
strict liability as requiring proof of an "unreasonably dangerous"
defect. 95
It can be argued that (i) since a plaintiff in a warranty suit must
prove only "unmerchantability" and (ii) since "unmerchantability"
equals "defect," then requiring the plaintiff to prove "defect" plus
"unreasonable danger" is to require him to prove more than "unmer-
chantability" alone. Several courts of other states have eliminated the
additional "unreasonable danger" requirement from their strict liabil-
ity actions, holding that requiring proof of "unreasonably dangerous
defect," instead of simply "defect," is overly burdensome to the plain-
tiff.96 In terms of jury instructions or the necessary showing for a
motion to dismiss or for a directed verdict, it seems reasonable to
conclude that requiring a plaintiff to prove that the defect is unrea-
Hutchinson Mfg. Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66, 69-70 (Ky. 1973) (In a design case, "the
distinction between the so-called strict liability principle and negligence is of no
practical significance so far as the standard of conduct required of the defendant is
concerned. In either event the standard required is reasonable care."). Thus, in
describing the plaintiffs requirement of proof, courts generally draw distinctions
based on the type of defect, whether the plaintiff is suing in strict tort or warranty.
See Reddick v. White Consol. Indus., 295 F. Supp. 243, 245-49 (S.D. Ga. 1969);
McMichael v. American Red Cross, 532 S.W.2d 7. 11 (Ky. 1975); McGuire v.
Nelson, 162 Mont. 37, 42-45, 508 P.2d 558, 561-62 (1973); Elliott v. Lachance, 109
N.H. 481, 484-85, 256 A.2d 153, 155-56 (1969); Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96
N.J. Super. 314, 326-27, 232 A.2d 879, 886 (Law Div. 1967), rev'd on other grounds,
53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969); McCarthy v. Bristol Laboratories, 61 A.D.2d 196,
201-02, 401 N.Y.S.2d 509, 513 (1978); Dickey v. Lockport Prestress, Inc., 52 A.D.2d
1075, 1075-76, 384 N.Y.S.2d 609, 609-10 (1976); Rainbow v. Albert Elia Bldg. Co.,
49 A.D.2d 250, 252-53, 373 N.Y.S.2d 928, 930 (1975).
92. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342-43, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461, 469-70 (1973).
93. See, e.g., Merced v. Auto Pak Co., 533 F.2d 71, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1976);
Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 468 F. Supp. 593, 600 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd in
part on other grounds, 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981); Wolfgruber v. Upjohn Co., 72
A.D.2d 59, 62, 423 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (1979), ajf'd, 52 N.Y.2d 768, 417 N.E.2d 1002,
436 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1980); Biss v. Tenneco, Inc., 64 A.D.2d 204, 206-07, 409
N.Y.S.2d 874, 876 (1978); Jerry v. Borden Co., 45 A.D.2d 344, 348, 358 N.Y.S.2d
426, 430-31 (1974); Steinik v. Doctors Hosp., 82 Misc. 2d 97, 99, 368 N.Y.S.2d 767,
770 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
94. 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342-43, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 469-70
(1973).
95. See supra note 93. For the Restatement's language, see supra note 1.
96. E.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209,
213-14 (Alaska 1975); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132-33, 501 P.2d
1153, 1161-62, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 441-42 (1972); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry &
Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 176, 406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co.,
[Vol. 50
1981] PRODUCTS LIABILITY & U.C.C. § 2-318 79
sonably dangerous could result in a decision for the defendant when
requiring a showing merely of unmerchantability or defectiveness
would not.97
The second distinction between the causes of action is more signifi-
cant. The Code offers a potentially longer statute of limitations. If a
plaintiff is injured by a product, he has three years from the date of
injury to bring an action in strict tort liability.08 The limitations
period under the Code for breach of warranty, however, commences
upon tender of the product to the buyer and continues for four
years. 99 Thus, if the plaintiff is injured within the first year from
tender, the statutory period for a breach of warranty suit will be
longer. 00
480 Pa. 547, 557-59, 391 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1978); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter
Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 95-97, 337 A.2d 893, 899-900 (1975).
97. The significance of the "'unreasonably dangerous" requirement is illustrated
in the recent case of Vineyard v. Empire Mach. Co., 119 Ariz. 502, 581 P.2d 1152
(Ct. App. 1978). There, the court held that while the absence of a rollover bar
rendered an earthmover defective, it was not unreasonably dangerous and thus did
not give rise to its manufacturer's strict liability. Id. at 505-06, 581 P.2d at 1155-56.
98. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 214 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981) ("The following
actions must be commenced within three years: ... an action to recover damages for
an injury to property; ... an action to recover damages for a personal injury
99. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-725 (McKinney 1964). "(1) An action for breach of any
contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has
accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to
not less than one year but may not extend it. (2) A cause of action accrues when the
breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A
breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a
warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the
breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the
breach is or should have been discovered." Id.; see Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black
Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 819 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979);
Witherell v. Weimer, 77 Ill. App. 3d 582, 585-86, 396 N.E.2d 268, 271 (1979); Fazio
v. Ford Motor Corp., 69 A.D.2d 896, 896, 415 N.Y.S.2d 889, 890 (1979); Ribley v.
Harsco Corp., 57 A.D.2d 234, 236, 394 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (1977). The Code statute
of limitations contains a provision that the cause of action does not accrue at the time
of tender if the "warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and
discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance .... N.Y.U.C.C.
§ 2-725(2) (McKinney 1964). Although this provision would seem to be a means of
applying the discovery rule to breach of warranty actions under the Code, it has
uniformly been held that an implied warranty by its very nature cannot ex al.d to
future performance. Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1104
(N.D.N.Y. 1977); Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 652, 545 P.2d 371,
378 (1976). Thus, unless tolled through common-law;' rules, which are not abrogated
by the Code, N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-725(4) (McKinney 1964), the cause of action accrues
upon tender.
100. The following hypothetical illustrates the operation of the two statutes of
limitations. The plaintiff purchases a product from defendant on January 2, 1980,
which product is properly tendered. On May 15, 1980, the plaintiff is injured due to
an actionable defect. The plaintiff may sue in strict liability (or negligence) until May
15, 1983, but he may bring a breach of warranty action until January 2, 1984. If the
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This distinction is usually the reason that parties assert that they are
beneficiaries of the Code or that they should be afforded some
common-law breach of warranty action: They have simply failed to
bring their strict liability action within the statutory period.',, Un-
like the substantive difference, which may affect a determination on
the merits, this procedural distinction can determine whether the
merits of the case will be heard at all.102
III. SECTION 2-318: THE AMENDMENT WITHOUT A CAUSE
If the New York amendment to section 2-318 could be viewed as
benign, perhaps it might be relegated to the category of legislative
curiosities. In an area of law such as products liability, however,
where a need for clarification and reform has been increasingly recog-
nized, 0 3 the amendment has led to a number of difficulties. First, it
raises the question of whether the legislature intended to preempt the
field of products liability by the adoption of the Code. Massachusetts
and Delaware have opted for such a preemption. 04 These states,
however, have expressly rejected strict liability in favor of a breach of
injury occurred on May 15, 1981, however,the plaintiff may bring a tort action until
May 15, 1984, though the warranty action will still be available only until January 2,
1984. Moreover, if the plaintiff is injured on June 1, 1984, he may not bring a
warranty action at all, but will have until June 1, 1987, in which to bring a tort
action. See Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 403, 335 N.E.2d
275, 278-79, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 43-44 (1975). Victorson overruled Mendel v. Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969), In
which the court held the warranty statute of limitations applicable. 37 N.Y.2d at
400, 335 N.E.2d at 276, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 40. At that time, however, strict liability
had yet to be adopted in New York, and breach of warranty was the only action
available in products liability. Thus, if the injury occurred more than four years after
tender, the plaintiff could be barred before any cause of action had accrued. See
generally Massery, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitation -A New Immunity for Prod-
uct Suppliers, 1977 Ins. L.J. 535; Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of
Products Liability Statutes of Limitations, 56 N.C. L. Rev. 663 (1978).
101. See, e.g., Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 590-91, 374
N.E.2d 97, 100-01, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185, 188-89 (1978); Atkinson v. Ormont Mach.
Co., 102 Misc. 2d 468, 470-71, 423 N.Y.S.2d 577, 579-80 (Sup. Ct. 1979); Beninati v.
Oldsmobile Div., 94 Misc. 2d 835, 837, 405 N.Y.S.2d 917, 918 (Sup. Ct. 1978). For
similar holdings in other jurisdictions, see Miles v. Bell Helicopter Co., 385 F. Supp.
1029 (D. Ga. 1974); Colvin v. FMC Corp., 43 Or. App. 709, 604 P.2d 157 (1979); see
also Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Or. 273, 277, 512 P.2d 776, 778 (1973)
(warranty action under the Code permitted even though strict liability claim barred
by statute of limitations).
102. See, e.g., Branden v. Gerbie, 62 Il1. App. 3d 138, 140, 379 N.E.2d 7, 8
(1978); McCarthy v. Bristol Laboratories, 61 A.D.2d 196, 199, 401 N.Y.S.2d 509,
511 (1978).
103. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
104. Handy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 596, 607 (D. Del. 1971); Cline v.
Prowler Indus., 418 A.2d 968, 971 (Del. 1980); Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d
964, 968-69 (Mass. 1978); Swartz v. General Motors Corp., 378 N.E.2d 61, 63-64
(Mass. 1978).
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warranty action. 105 In New York, the legislature gave no indication
whatsoever that the rule in Codling was to be preempted by the
Code.106
Second, the legislature gave no direction as to what to do with the
procedural aspects of the Code when the plaintiff is not a party to the
contract. The statute of limitations in sales contracts, for instance,
runs from the date of tender of delivery. 0 7 This rule is based on the
logical premise that the breach occurs when defective goods are
handed over to the buyer,10 8 not when the defect becomes mani-
fest. 109 Thus, the date on which the limitations period commences
has no relationship to a non-buying plaintiff or to his injury. Any
plaintiff can be precluded from a warrant), suit even before the harm
occurs." 0 In addition, the legislature has not given an) indication as
105. Cline v. Prowler Indus., 418 A.2d 968, 980 (Del. 1980); Swartz v. General
Motors Corp., 378 N.E.2d 61, 63-64 (Mass. 1978); see Parish v. B. F. Goodrich Co.,
395 Mich. 271, 284-95, 235 N.W.2d 570, 576-81 (1975) (Williams, J., dissenting).
When Michigan courts refer to breach of implied warranty in lieu of strict liability,
however, they appear to be speaking not of the warranty action provided by the
Code, but rather of a tort cause of action substantially identical to strict liability. See
Hanson v. Art Post Am., Inc., 83 Mich. App. 553, 557-58, 269 N.V.2d 222, 24
(1978).
106. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
107. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (McKinney 1964); see supra notes 98-102.
108. Raymond-Dravo-Langenfelder v. Microdot, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 614, 617 (D.
Del. 1976); Continental Oil Co. v. General Am. Transp. Corp., 409 F. Supp. 288,
292 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Curtis v. Murphy Elevator Co., 407 F. Supp. 940, 94445
(E.D. Tenn. 1976); Tomes v. Chrysler Corp., 60 111. App. 3d 707, 710-11, 377
N.E.2d 224, 226-27 (1978); Fazio v. Ford Motor Corp., 69 A.D.2d 896, 896, 415
N.Y.S.2d 889, 890 (1979).
109. Raymond-Dravo-Langenfelder v. Microdot, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 614, 617 (D.
Del. 1976); see McCarthy v. Bristol Laboratories, 61 A.D.2d 196, 199-200, 401
N.Y.S.2d 509, 511-12 (1978). Where the warranty explicitly extends to future per-
formance, however, the cause of action accrues "when the breach is or should have
been discovered." Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d 992, 998, 354
N.Y.S.2d 778, 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (citation omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 50
A.D.2d 866, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1975). An implied warranty, though, -by its very
nature, cannot explicitly extend to future performance." Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte
Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1104 (N.D.N.Y. 1977): accord Voth v. Chrysler Motor
Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 652, 545 P.2d 371, 378 (1976).
110. The New York Court of Appeals incurred much criticism by affirming a
decision that imposed the warranty statute of limitations on what was essentially a
strict liability claim brought under the name of breach of warranty. In Mendel v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 57 Misc. 2d 45, 291 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Sup. Ct. 1967), af'd,
29 A.D.2d 918, 290 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1968), afJ'd, 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305
N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969), the court held that the contract law statute of limitations
accruing from time of tender should apply. Id. at 46, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 96. Occasion-
ally, this would allow the plaintiff to be barred before the injury occurred. See supra
notes 99-100. Following the adoption of strict liability, the Court of Appeals wisely
corrected this error by overruling Mendel in Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975), holding that the tort statute
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to which date of tender is controlling: that from the manufacturer to
wholesaler, wholesaler to retailer, or retailer to consumer.'' When a
bystander is hurt, no date makes more sense than any other.1 2  For
the purposes of judicial efficiency and ease of analyzing claims, the
legislature should have defined the exact date from which the statute
is to run when a bystander, or other party not in privity, is harmed.
Even if a plaintiff were barred from bringing a warranty action by
the statute of limitations before he was harmed, no grave injustice
would result. He would still be able to sue under strict liability. " 3 He
would have lost, however, the opportunity to benefit from the poten-
tially lesser proof requirement of breach of warranty-that the prod-
uct is merely unmerchantable, not defective and unreasonably dan-
gerous as in strict liability."14
Similarly, the Code's provisions on notice preclude an injured
plaintiff from suing if he does not give timely notice of breach."15 Yet
the purpose of such a requirement is presumably to allow the seller to
"cure" a defective tender." 6 In a personal injury case, the harm has
of limitations (three years from date of injury) would govern strict liability actions
and stating in dictum that the Code statute (four years from tender) would govern
warranty actions. Id. at 403, 335 N.E.2d at 278-79, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 43-44. New
York's adoption of Alternative B of § 2-318, see supra note 75, resurrects the Mendel
holding in that the four-year statute of limitations must be applied in warranty
actions. The danger of Mendel-that an injured person will be left without any
remedy-no longer exists, because such a plaintiff now has a tort action accruing on
the date of injury. Amended § 2-318, however, again raises the potential for the
curious situation in which the plaintiff's warranty cause of action is barred before he
is injured. A buyer at least technically has a cause of action upon tender since he
received a defective product. A non-buyer, however, can sue only if he is harmed and
if the harm occurs within four years from tender. See Fazio v. Ford Motor Corp., 69
A.D.2d 896, 896, 415 N.Y.S.2d 889, 890 (1979); Ribley v. Harsco Corp., 57 A.D.2d
234, 236, 394 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (1977).
111. Courts usually hold that the applicable tender is the retail sale. See, e.g.,
Patterson v. Her Majesty Indus., 450 F. Supp. 425, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
112. See Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 256 Pa. Super. Ct. 330, 343, 389
A.2d 1148, 1155 (1978). In rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the Code warranty
statute of limitations should apply although he was not within the class protected by
Alternative A, the Salvador court observed that it "takes a very strained reading of
[the Code's statute of limitations section] to conclude that it was ever meant to apply
to persons other than the contracting parties in breach of warranty actions." Id. at
341, 389 A.2d at 1154 (citation omitted).
113. The tort statute of limitations runs three years from date of injury. N.Y. Civ.
Prac. Law § 214 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
114. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
115. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (McKinney 1964) ("Where a tender has been
accepted ... the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should
have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any
remedy .... ).
116. Id. § 2-508 (permitting a seller under some circumstances to remedy a
defective performance).
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already occurred and notice would serve little purpose. Nonetheless, if
notice is not timely given, the plaintiff will be barred from any Code
remedy.1 17
The Code also provides explicitly that the seller may disclaim war-
ranties." 8 Although limitation of remedies for personal injury is not
permitted," 9 it is theoretically possible for the seller validly to dis-
claim all warranties,120 and there can be no suit for breach of a
117. Id. § 2-607(3)(a). Often the notice requirement is disregarded entirely when
strict adherence to its provisions would result in injustice to an injured consumer. See
James, supra note 19, at 197 (Notice requirement "may prove a trap to the unwary
victim who will generally not be steeped in the 'business practice' which justifies the
rule."). The Code, however, contemplates that the notice requirement be construed
very broadly when the plaintiff is not a business person and the sale was a consumer,
rather than commercial, transaction. See Smith v. Butler, 19 Md. App. 467, 471-72,
311 A.2d 813, 816-17 (1973) (no formal requirements of notice; buyer must merely
let seller know that something is wrong with the product); Fischer v. Mead Johnson
Laboratories, 41 A.D.2d 737, 737, 341 N.Y.S.2d 257, 259 (1973) (notice required in
commercial transactions only); Phillips, Notice of Breach in Sales and Strict Tort
Liability Law: Should There Be a Difference?, 47 Ind. L.J. 457, 470-71 (1972)
(notice requirement not unfair unless unreasonably oppressive to the plaintiff).
118. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-316 (McKinney 1964).
119. Id. § 2-719(3). The Code permits the parties to agree upon liquidated dam-
ages in the event of breach, provided the amount is reasonable in light of the
"'anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and
the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy." Id.
§ 2-718(1). But this section may not be used to limit liability for personal injury. Id.
§ 2-719(3).
120. Id. § 2-316(2). Even the section on limitation of remedies recognizes that
such limitation is "merely an allocation of unknown or undeterminable risks." Id. §
2-719 official comment 3. That section further provides that, although remedies
cannot be manipulated to limit the buyer's recovery, "[t]he seller in all cases is free to
disclaim warranties." Id. To be effective, disclaimers must mention the word "mer-
chantability" and, if in writing, must be conspicuous. Id. § 2-316(2). The court
determines whether a disclaimer is conspicuous. Id. § 1-201(10). Frequently courts
find that even if a party has agreed to a disclaimer, the provision is void because it
does not meet these formal requirements. See Mill Printing & Lithographing Corp. v.
Solid Waste Mgt. Sys., Inc., 65 A.D.2d 590, 590-91, 409 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258 (1978);
Victor v. Mammana, 101 Misc. 2d 954, 955-56, 422 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351 (Sup. Ct.
1979); Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 557 P.2d 1009, 1011-12 (Utah 1976).
See generally Velez v. Crane & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d
750, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1973). Moreover, a disclaimer of warranty, like any other
contract provision, may be invalidated by the court if it is determined to be uncon-
scionable. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (McKinney 1964). The test for unconscionability is
vague. Essentially, it requires that a provision must not be so one-sided as to lead to
oppression and unfair surprise. The section does not purport to disturb the "alloca-
tion of risks because of superior bargaining power." Id. § 2-302 official comment 1.
But see Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 485, 516-28 (1967) (unconscionability may not have been intended by
formulators of the Code to be a means of overriding implied warranty disclaimers).
The Code also imposes a duty of good faith upon the parties, N.Y.U.C.C. § 1-203
(McKinney 1964), which cannot be disclaimed. Id. § 1-102(3). Cood faith is defined
to mean "honesty in fact," id. § 1-201(19), a subjective standard applicable to all
1981]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
nonexistent warranty. New York appears to recognize the validity of
contractual restrictions for personal injury liability pursuant to the
Code. 121 Problems arise, however, with remote parties. To give ef-
fect to disclaimers with respect to a party who has never seen the
contract has been characterized in New York as unfair to the injured
party; 122 yet to deny effect to the disclaimer is both to disregard the
Code and to interfere with an element of the contract for which the
seller bargained and presumably provided consideration.
Third, the amendment can be viewed as a retrogression in the law
of products liability in that it resurrects the old breach of warranty
action as it was used by courts to redress product-caused harms prior
to the adoption of strict liability. 123 The majority of courts have,
however, preferred strict liability. 124 Taking only judicial efficiency
and clarity of doctrine as goals, the reinstatement of this quasi-dupli-
cative cause of action has remuddied the waters of products liability
theory just when New York, following Codling, was successfully sort-
ing out the two theories 125-and this at a time when courts and
commentators alike were recognizing the need for a unified products
liability theory. 26
parties under the Code. In the case of a merchant who is the defendant in a warranty
action, however, an additional definition of good faith applies-an objective
standard of conduct based upon "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing."
Id. § 2-103(1)(b). Some states have enacted statutes prohibiting disclaimers of im-
plied warranties in favor of consumers. See, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 106, § 2-316A
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1976). On the federal level, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976), pro-
hibits disclaimers of warranty in consumer sales if the seller either gives the buyer a
written warranty or enters into a service contract with the buyer within ninety days
of the date of sale. Id. § 2308(a). Limitations on the duration of the warranty period
are allowed, however, if conscionable. Id. § 2308(b).
121. See Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 124-25, 305
N.E.2d 750, 754, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617, 623 (1973).
122. Dorman v. International Harvester Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 11, 19-20, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 516, 522-23 (1975); Sellman Auto, Inc. v. McGowan, 89 Nev. 353, 355-56, 513
P.2d 1228, 1230 (1973); Mill Printing & Lithographing Corp. v. Solid Waste Mgt.
Sys., Inc., 65 A.D.2d 590, 590-91, 409 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258 (1978). See generally
Weintraub, Disclaimer of Warranties and Limitation of Damages for Breach of
Warranty Under the UCC, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 60 (1974).
123. See supra notes 22-45 and accompanying text.
124. Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676, 680 & n.2 (D.N.H.
1972); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 286 n.12 (Alaska 1976);
Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244, 248 & n.10 (Alaska 1969);
Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 614-15, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132,
137 (1973); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 348-52, 363 A.2d 955,
961-62 (1976); Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 93, 179 N.W.2d 64,
70-71 (1970); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 156-57, 305 A.2d 412, 426-27
(1973); Hill v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, 268 S.E.2d 296, 303-05 (W. Va. 1980).
125. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Fourth, to the extent the plaintiff is held to a higher showing of
proof in a strict liability action than in a breach of warranty action,
the amendment creates an inconsistency in the law. Society, as mir-
rored in judicial decisions, wishes to protect itself either from any
defects or from unreasonably dangerous defects only. Because no
other substantive characteristic distinguishes the causes of action in
New York, 12 7 an anomaly exists in that one of the causes of action
must not accurately reflect the current social temperament vis-h-vis
the level of defectiveness to be tolerated.
Fifth, in any suit by an injured non-purchaser joining both causes of
action, the jury will be confronted with dual instructions, each
phrased in wholly different language and each requiring a sufficient
amount of background explanation to enable the jury to make an
educated finding.128  It is submitted that instructions based on the
Code as well as on Codling, with variations in liability and procedure,
can lead only to obfuscation.-12 9
Sixth, parties are now less sure of the availability of the breach of
warranty cause of action. This lack of clarity gives rise to a potential
for increased expense to the parties and burden on the court sys-
tem. 10 This situation has arisen not so much due to any confusion
surrounding the causes of action themselves but more because of the
Court of Appeals' suggestion in Martin v. Julius Dierck Equipment
Co. 13 that it might not give effect to the amendment. 3 2  In Martin,
127. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
128. See Recent Developments in Commercial Law, 11 Rut.-Cam. L.J. 527, 605
(1980) ("The majority's rationale [in a decision modifying the strict liability stand-
ard] for adopting the 'not reasonably fit, suitable and safe' standard is compelling:
avoidance of jury confusion regarding the unreasonably dangerous standard.") [here-
inafter cited as Recent Developments].
129. See Stenberg v. Beatrice Foods Co., 176 Mont. 123, 130-31, 576 P.2d 7095,
729-30 (1978).
130. Section 2-318 has led to the situation described by Dean Green in which
reliance by the courts upon the language technic of one doctrine (breach of warranty)
to effectuate another (strict liability) results in distorted analysis. See supra note 32.
131. 43 N.Y.2d 583, 374 N.E.2d 97, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1978).
132. Id. at 591-92, 374 N.E.2d at 101, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 189. In Martin, the
plaintiff was injured at his employer's place of business when a forklift malfunc-
tioned. His employer had purchased the truck from the manufacturer through a
distributor in New York City on June 26, 1967. Plaintiff brought suit for negligence
and breach of implied warranty against the distributor on May 21, 1971 and the
manufacturer in June of that year. Id. at 587, 374 N.E.2d at 98, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, alleging that (1) the cause of action
was in tort and thus had accrued at the situs of the injury, Virginia, (2) that the
forum state was bound by its borrowing statute to apply the Virginia statute of
limitations, (3) that the Virginia limitations period is two years from the date of
accrual, and (4) that the action accrued on May 6, 1969 (the date on which plaintiff
reached his twenty-first birthday, rather than the date of the injury, the statute was
tolled until then). Thus, they argued that the actions were time-barred. Id. at
587-88, 374 N.E.2d at 98-99, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 186-87. Although the amended version
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the plaintiff was a non-buyer whose cause of action accrued prior to
the adoption of the amendment to section 2-318. Thus, the court did
not apply the amendment. However, the majority observed in dictum
that there would probably be disagreement as to the effect of the
amendment when a case properly involving it was before the
court.133 Additionally, the majority noted that if a warranty com-
plaint by a non-purchaser were allowed to stand, the time and place
of accrual would be governed by tort, not contract, principles. 34  On
the other hand, the court stated that were it to allow a breach of
warranty action, damages recoverable might be limited to contract
damages, 35 but it did not discuss how those would differ from tort
damages.
If Martin suggests solely that absent Alternative B breach of war-
ranty should no longer be available to non-purchasing plaintiffs, the
decision is wise and in accord with other jurisdictions. 13 It is also an
affirmation of the Codling case, which held that a breach of warranty
action brought by a non-purchaser is actually a strict liability case. 37
Absent some constitutional infirmity in the amendment, however, it is
very doubtful that the court has the power to ignore it.13 8 Yet several
of § 2-318 was in effect when the case reached the Court of Appeals, the court
declined to give the amendment retroactive effect. Id. at 591, 374 N.E.2d at 101, 403
N.Y.S.2d at 189. Martin is one of several cases in which New York courts evidence a
preference to treat personal injury actions as tort claims, even if a prior contractual
relationship between the parties would give rise to an action in contract. See Sears
Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assoc., 43 N.Y.2d 389, 395, 372 N.E.2d 555, 558, 401
N.Y.S.2d 767, 770 (1977); Deutsch Relays Inc. v. Giffords Oil Co., 105 Misc. 2d 524,
525-26, 432 N.Y.S.2d 4,48, 449 (Sup. Ct. 1980). Enco allows contract damages but
not tort damages when suit is brought after the tort statute has run. 43 N.Y.2d at
395, 372 N.E.2d at 558, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 770. One commentator has noted that a
"satisfactory principle for this distinction has yet to be offered by anyone."
McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 10, 1980, at 1, 2, col. 1.
133. 43 N.Y.2d at 591, 374 N.E.2d at 101, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 589-90, 374 N.E.2d at 100, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 188-89.
136. E.g., Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 625 F.2d 1095, 1103 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1516 (1981); Moss v. Polyco, Inc., 522 P.2d 622, 626 (Okla.
1974); Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 256 Pa. Super. Ct. 330, 334-35, 389
A.2d 1148, 1150-51 (1978).
137. See supra note 63. "In Martin, the Court of Appeals finally laid to rest the old
common law concept of implied warranty, at least insofar as [the warranty action]
relates to plaintiffs who are not in privity with the defendant." Weinberger, The
Law of Implied Warranty: What Hath Martin Wrought?, 13 Trial Law. Q. 21, 33
(Spring 1980).
138. The doctrine of separation of powers binds a court to apply a statute even
though it questions the wisdom of the legislation. In re Fosdick's Trust, 4 N.Y.2d 646,
655-56, 152 N.E.2d 228, 233, 176 N.Y.S.2d 966, 973 (1958); People v. Breslin, 4
N.Y.2d 73, 78, 149 N.E.2d 85, 88, 172 N.Y.S.2d 157, 161 (1958); People ex. rel.
Doctors Hosp. v. Sexton, 267 A.D. 736, 742-43, 48 N.Y.S.2d 201, 207 (1944), aff'd
per curiam, 295 N.Y. 553, 64 N.E.2d 273 (1945); Purdy v. McGarity, 262 A.D. 623,
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lower courts have expressly stated in dicta that the Court of Appeals
might not permit a warranty suit in the absence of privity, notwith-
standing the presence of section 2-318.139 One court, however, ob-
serving that the Martin court found no constitutional defect, applied
the statute to permit a suit by a non-purchasing user. 140
626, 30 N.Y.S.2d 966, 971 (1941); Kornbluth v. Reavy, 261 A.D. 60, 62, 24 N.Y.S.2d
514, 517 (1941); Dickerson, Products Liability: Dean Wade and the Constitutionality
of Section 402A, 44 Tenn. L. Rev. 205, 208 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Dickerson 11].
"Indeed, Martin could not [prohibit warranty suits by those not in privity], constitu-
tionally speaking, in that the statute in question is clear and unambiguous. Under the
New York State Constitution the courts are bound to give Section 2-318 of the Code a
literal interpretation." Weinberger, supra note 137, at 33. But see Hoenig, Products
Liability: Clarification of Breach of Warranty Actions, N.Y.L.J., March 29, 1978, at
1, col. 1, in which the author suggests that courts would have authority constitution-
ally to require privity in warranty suits-as Martin suggests-because the amend-
ment applies only to horizontal privity and is neutral on the question of vertical
privity. See supra note 26.
139. The most recent interpretation of Martin came in Fisher v. Graco Inc., 81
A.D.2d 209, 440 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1981). There the plaintiff's employer bought the
product prior to the effective date of § 2-318, but the plaintiff was injured after the
effective date. The tort statute had run before the plaintiff brought his cause of
action, and so the issue centered on whether he would have a breach of warranty
suit. The court held that he would not. Martin, the court observed, had stated that
even if the plaintiff sues in warranty, the cause of action accrues on injury. The
Fisher court noted that the plaintiff, however, did not have a cause of action for
warranty because, according to the Martin court, a party not in privity does not have
a suit for breach of warranty, but one for negligence or strict tort. Id. at 210, 440
N.Y.S.2d at 382. Moreover, even if the amendment were to change this principle, the
results would be the same, since the purchase occurred before the effective date of the
amendment and, under the then-existing § 2-318, plaintiff was not within the class
protected by the warranties. Id. at 210-11, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 382. Thus, the case
clearly suggests that a breach of warranty action by a non-purchaser might not be
allowed, as Martin had indicated. See supra note 133. Similar holdings are found in
Ramos v. Gulf & Western Indus., N.Y.L.J., July 3, 1979, at 11, col. I (Sup. Ct. June
26,1979), and Connar v. General Motors Corp., N.Y.L.J., July 12, 1978, at 14, col. 1
(Sup. Ct. July 6, 1978). In Ramos, the court noted that although the Court of
Appeals in Martin may have intended to preclude breach of warranty suits absent
privity, it was relieved of so holding because the plaintiff had not filed within either
the tort or the Code statute of limitations period. N.Y.L.J., July 3, 1979, at 11, cols.
1-2. The Ramos court noted, however, that even in a Code action, the tort statute
alone might apply by virtue of Martin. Id. Similarly, in Connor, the court dismissed
the breach of warranty cause of action, suggesting that Martin may indicate an
intent to eliminate suits in warranty by non-purchasers. N.Y.L.J., July 12, 1978, at
14, cols. 1-2.
140. Atkinson v. Ormont Mach. Co., 102 Misc. 2d 468, 423 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup.
Ct. 1979). The court stated that it would "not annul a statute that has not been
declared unconstitutional nor assume that the Court of Appeals intended to usurp the
function of the Legislature by withdrawing the statutory remedy and substituting in
its place one of judicial creation, of a new concept, namely, 'strict products liabil-
ity."' Id. at 469, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 579; see Martin v. Drackett Prods. Co., 100 Misc.
2d 728, 732-33, 420 N.Y.S.2d 147, 150 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (allowing a cause of action
against the manufacturer under § 2-318 by a plaintiff who had bought the product
from an intermediary). Other cases interpreting Martin include Mack v. Clairol,
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Martin thus leaves the availability of a warranty action uncertain.
It is therefore likely that defendants subject to breach of warranty
liability by virtue of amended section 2-318 will prefer litigation to
settlement. Additionally, non-purchasing plaintiffs precluded by the
running of the tort statute will seek to sue under the warranty cause of
action if that limitations period has not run.14' The amendment also
gives rise to other issues previously considered settled by the adoption
of strict liability: (i) when the statute should begin to run; 1 2 (ii) what
the effect of disclaimers is; 43 and (iii) whether notice is required. 14
Moreover, it is possible that defendants will argue that by eliminating
the privity requirement, the legislature intended that strict liability be
effected not through Codling, but through the Code. If this is the
case, the argument would go, then the procedural requirements of the
Code would also apply to strict liability actions, a proposition certain
to be hotly contested by plaintiffs.145  The cost of resolving these
issues, in terms of time and expense to plaintiffs, defendants and the
court system, will be considerable.
IV. STREAMLINING PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW IN NEw YORK
The existence of two nearly identical causes of action is difficult tojustify. Given the problems created by the amendment,' 4" the criti-
Inc., 69 A.D.2d 752, 752, 415 N.Y.S.2d 16, 17 (1979) (absent privity, implied
warranty action is strict liability); Titlebaum v. Loblaws, Inc., 64 A.D.2d 822, 822,
407 N.Y.S.2d 307, 308 (1978) (lack of privity is a defense in a warranty action);
Frank v. Clairol, Inc., N.Y.L.J., May 15, 1979, at 11, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. May 9, 1979)(no cause of action for either express or implied warranty breach can be brought
absent privity); Altman v. Upjohn Co., N.Y.L.J., Oct. 12, 1978, at 18, col. 5 (Sup.
Ct. Sept. 28, 1978) (if plaintiff is determined not to be in privity, then the warranty
claim is to be dismissed); Maure v. Fordham Motor Sales, Inc., 98 Misc. 2d 979, 983,
414 N.Y.S.2d 882, 884 (Civ. Ct. 1979) (dicta) (warranty action would be permitted
in personal injury case despite lack of privity; citing Martin dissent). In fact, it has
been argued that strict liability actions are unconstitutional because the Code, as a
statute, preempts the field of product-related injury suits. The controversy has been
largely academic, with such writers as Professors Dickerson and Shanker arguing that
strict liability is unconstitutional, Dickerson II, supra note 138; Shanker, supra note
19, and Dean Wade arguing that it is not. Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second
Restatement of Torts Preempted by the UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42
Tenn. L. Rev. 123 (1974). Courts have not taken the challenge to strict liability too
seriously. Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259, 272-73, 509 P.2d 529, 535
(1973) (strict liability is not preempted).
141. See Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 587, 374 N.E.2d 97,
98, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (1978); Atkinson v. Ormont Mach. Co., 102 Misc. 2d 468,
470-71, 423 N.Y.S.2d 577, 579-80 (Sup. Ct. 1979); D. Siegel, Handbook on New
York Practice § 37 (Supp. 1979).
142. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
146. See supra pt. III.
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cism of it by courts 147 and commentators, 48 and the need for simplify-
ing products liability law, 149 significant remedial measures are re-
quired. The Court of Appeals in Martin v. Julius Dierck Equipment
Co. 50 clearly implied that it might treat any breach of warranty suit
brought by a non-purchaser as a strict liability case 5 s'-which indeed
it is.'52 Nonetheless, it is doubtful that any court can disregard such a
clear statutory directive as section 2-318. 153 Any efforts, then, to
remedy the situation created by section 2-318 will most likely have to
be legislative.
There are several legislative options. First, the Code could be
amended to re-erect the privity barrier in some way and to allow strict
liability and breach of warranty to coexist, as they did until 1975.
Second, strict liability could be expressly abrogated, permitting the
Code to take over as the mechanism for remedying product-caused
harms. Third, breach of warranty for personal injury could be abro-
gated, and strict liability could be retained as the sole means for
recovery.
A. Retaining the Two Causes of Action
If both actions were retained, some modification of section 2-318
would be necessary to avoid the problems now caused by the near
duplication of the actions. One commentator has suggested merely
repealing section 2-318,1-4 thereby allowing a breach of warranty
147. See Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 591, 374 N.E.2d 97,
101, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185, 189 (1978); Ramos v. Gulf & Western Indus., N.Y.L.J., July
3, 1979, at 11, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. June 26, 1979); Connar v. General Motors Corp.,
N.Y.L.J., July 12, 1978, at 14, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. July 6, 1978).
148. D. Siegel, Handbook on New York Practice § 37 (Supp. 1979); Martin, Torts,
Survey of New York Law, 30 Syracuse L. Rev. 555, 563 (1979).
149. Birnbaum I, supra note 19, at 252-55; Epstein I, supra note 19, at 651-52: see
Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336, 345, 322 A.2d 440, 444 (1974) (there
should be only one theory of recovery: strict liability); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63
N.J. 130, 156, 305 A.2d 412, 426-27 (1973) (same). The Model Uniform Product
Liability Act, a model statute offered by the U.S. Department of Commerce to state
legislatures wishing to unify existing products liability law, states: "The principal
purposes of the Act are to provide a fair balance of the interests of both product users
and sellers and to eliminate existing confusion and uncertainty about their respective
legal rights and obligations." Model Uniform Product Liability Act preamble (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1979), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,716 (1979).
150. 43 N.Y.2d 583, 374 N.E.2d 97, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1978).
151. Id. at 591, 374 N.E.2d at 101, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
152. See supra notes 38-44.
153. See supra note 138.
154. Martin, supra note 148, at 563. "If [the legislature] was attempting to codify
Codling, the result was not just unnecessary; it also missed the point of the Court's
shift from 'breach of warranty' to 'strict products liability' terminology and, in so
doing, suggested a distinction that the Court has not been willing to recognize. If it
was attempting to give plaintiffs alternative statutes of limitations for products
1981]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
action only by direct buyers against immediate sellers. This is the
approach adopted by California. 5 5  Other possibilities exist. Alterna-
tive A, the pre-amendment version of section 2-318,150 could be rein-
stated, allowing suits by a buyer, his family members and guests in his
house as is the case in most states.15 7  Another choice would be to
reinstate Alternative A, but allow suits against any seller in the chain
of distribution. This is the Maryland approach.'5 "
If any of these alternatives resurrecting privity were selected, the
two different causes of action would once again be clearly distinguish-
able. 59 Anyone could sue for strict liability, while only buyers, or
those in a specified relationship with a buyer, could sue in breach of
warranty. Warranty actions brought by the parties specified in the
alternatives above, however, would suffer from many of the same
problems that surround the present section 2-318. Multiple instruc-
injuries, the intention was opaque and the result extremely difficult to justify. Unless
the legislature had some other, indiscernable purpose in mind, the better course
would be to repeal the now-redundant Code provisions which give non-contracting
consumers warranty remedies for personal injuries." Id. (footnote omitted).
155. The California version of the U.C.C. contains no § 2-318.
156. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney 1964). Other jurisdictions have similar priv-
ity requirements. See Klimas v. ITT, 297 F. Supp. 937, 939 (D.R.I. 1969); Lane v.
Barringer, 407 N.E.2d 1173, 1175 (Ind. App. 1980). Economic loss recovery usually
requires privity. Mendelson v. General Motors Corp., 105 Misc. 2d 346, 348, 432
N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (Sup. Ct. 1980). The extension of the warranty protection to those
in a close relationship to the buyer is based on the legal fiction that the buyer acted as
agent, a means of obviating privity requirements that existed in pre-Code law.
"[T]he primary hope for recovery in warranty by a member of a household who has
been injured by a defective commodity is to persuade the court that the family
member who personally made the purchase was the 'agent' of the injured party who
was the 'principal' in the transaction with seller." State of New York Law Revision
Comm'n, Article 2-Sales, Legislative Doc. No. 65(C). at 79-80 (1955), reprinted in
1 State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code 335,
413-14 (1955). Obvious problems arose with such fictions because "[als might be
expected, children [found] it somewhat more difficult to show that they [were] the
'principal' of a parent who effect[ed] a purchase." Id. at 80, reprinted in 1 State of
N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code at 414: see
Pendarvis v. General Motors Corp., 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 457 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1969).
157. See supra note 76.
158. Md. Com. Law Code Ann. § 2-314(1)(a), (b) (1975) ("'[S]eller' includes the
manufacturer, distributor, dealer, wholesaler or other middleman or the retailer
[and] [a]ny previous requirement of privity is abolished as between the buyer and the
seller in any action brought by the buyer.").
159. New York courts have frequently allowed both causes of action to be pleaded
if the plaintiff was properly within the case law or statutory requirements of both a
strict liability action and a breach of warranty action. See Lancaster Silo & Block Co.
v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 75 A.D.2d 55, 61, 427 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1013 (1980);
Cerrato v. R.H. Crown Co., 58 A.D.2d 721, 721, 396 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717 (1977);
Ribley v. Harsco Corp.. 57 A.D.2d 234, 236, 394 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (1977); Dickey
v. Lockport Prestress, Inc., 52 A.D.2d 1075, 1075-76, 384 N.Y.S.2d 609, 609-10
(1976); Nickel v. Hyster Co., 97 Misc. 2d 770, 773, 412 N.Y.S.2d 273, 275 (Sup. Ct.
1978).
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tions, for instance, could still confuse the jury, 160 and the fundamental
question of the Code's propriety as a mechanism for remedying per-
sonal injury would remain.'16
Given these problems, the question arises: Is there any overridingjustification for retaining both breach of warranty and strict liability?
The existence of breach of warranty can be justified only if society
wishes to offer slightly more protection to buyers than to non-buying
consumers. 162  This assertion is based on the proposition that the
breach of warranty action, when it coexists with strict liability, can
only benefit plaintiffs. An injured plaintiff would always be able to
sue in strict liability. When, however, he could take advantage of the
longer statute of limitations or the lower standard of liability, he
would be able to bring an action or to prevail in breach of warranty
when he would not in strict liability. 63
It is, however, by no means clear that society wishes to give more
protection to buyers. The argument might be made that because
society generally favors the transfer of property,164 the buyer should
be afforded special protection in order to encourage such activity. Yet
160. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
161. W. Prosser, supra note 21, at 656. It is "apparent that 'warranty,' as a device
for the justification of strict liability to the consumer, carries far too much luggage in
the way of undesirable complications, and is more trouble than it is worth." Id.
Moreover, the privity requirement creates an artificial means for determining to
whom the warranty cause of action is available. Consider this example: Two unre-
lated friends, X and Y, enter a grocery store so that X can buy a sandwich. Having
forgotten his money, X asks Y to buy the food for him, which he does. Later X eats
the sandwich, which turns out to be tainted, and becomes ill, suffering considerable
pain, medical expenses, and loss of earnings. If X and Y are in a jurisdiction with a
restrictive privity requirement, such as Alternative A of § 2-318, there can be no
breach of warranty action by X, since he was not in privity, nor by Y, since he
suffered no harm. In Titlebaum v. Loblaws, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 985, 429 N.Y.S.2d 92
(1980), a mother and son, injured when the boy carelessly unpacked a soda bottle
that exploded, were not allowed to state a claim in strict liability because the son had
been contributorily negligent. Because the mother was in privity and the jury found
the bottle unmerchantable, however, she was permitted to bring a warranty action.
Id. at 985-86, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 92-93.
162. The adverb "slightly" seems appropriate since only rarely will the availability
of the warranty action benefit the buyer. In most cases, the procedural limitations of
the warranty action will be a disadvantage and strict liability will be the more
convenient, if not the only, action. See Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F.
Supp. 676, 680 (D.N.H. 1972); Rossignol v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, 154
Conn. 549, 560-62, 227 A.2d 418, 423-24 (1967); Ellis v. Rich's, Inc., 233 Ga. 573,
576-77, 212 S.E.2d 373, 376 (1975).
163. E.g., Patterson v. Her Majesty Indus., 450 F. Supp. 425, 432-33 (E.D. Pa.
1978); McCarthy v. Bristol Laboratories, 61 A.D.2d 196, 199, 401 N.Y.S.2d 509, 511
(1978); Atkinson v. Ormont Mach. Co., 102 Misc. 2d 468, 469, 423 N.Y.S.2d 577,
579 (Sup. Ct. 1979); see supra notes 90-102 and accompanying text.
164. See Rafe v. Hindin, 29 A.D.2d 481, 484, 288 NY.S.2d 662, 665, aff'd, 23
N.Y.2d 759, 244 N.E.2d 469, 296 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1968).
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whether the minimally extra protection occasionally afforded buyers
by the Code would encourage sales is questionable. Any encourage-
ment to buyers afforded by the Code's warranty protection is at the
expense of sellers. More plaintiff's awards and the increasing cost of
liability insurance will drive more small entrepreneurs out of business,
thus having an inhibiting effect on the marketplace.'15
Nor does the argument seem valid that buyers are entitled to special
protection by virtue of their having paid consideration.' 0  It is
equally reasonable to argue that non-buyers are entitled to special
protection vis-h-vis buyers, because they do not have a buyer's ability
to inspect and learn about the product.'1 7 Thus, the extra protection
afforded by the Code is not a sufficiently important consideration to
compensate for the difficulties caused by the existence of two similar
causes of action.' 68 Because the need for a unified body of products
liability law has been consistently recognized in recent years, 0 D the
best solution to the current difficulties in New York is the abolition of
one of the causes of action.
B. Retaining Only Breach of Warranty
To abrogate Codling and retain only breach of warranty would be
to adopt the doctrine of contractual allocation of risk. 1 70 Under this
theory, the sales contract, supplemented by all the present provisions
of the Code, controls the cause of action. Thus, if the party injured
was not within the protected scope of section 2-318, he would be
precluded from any recovery.' 7' Similarly, the plaintiff would be
165. Birnbaum I, supra note 19, at 252-55.
166. It has been argued that the act of entering a contract for sale gives rise to
special obligations on the part of the seller to satisfy reasonable expectations on the
part of the buyer. See Lambert v. Sistrunk, 58 So. 2d 434, 434-35 (Fla. 1952); Lane
v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 503, 229 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1976); R. Pound,
Social Control Through Law 114 (1968). Some courts have held, however, that
safety from personal injury and property damage is not an element of the bargain
between the buyer and seller. Anglo E. Bulkships Ltd. v. Ameron, Inc., 460 F. Supp.
1212, 1213 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546,
561-62, 209 N.W.2d 643, 653 (1973); Milau Assoc. v. North Ave. Dev. Corp., 42
N.Y.2d 482, 488-89, 368 N.E.2d 1247, 1251, 398 N.Y.S.2d 882, 886 (1977).
167. See Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Or. 301, 308-09, 405 P.2d 624, 628
(1965).
168. See supra notes 103-40.
169. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
170. Speidel, The Virginia Anti-Privity Statute: Strict Products Liability Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 Va. L. Rev. 804, 851 (1965). The author suggests
that through the use of the Code as the sole means for remedying product-caused
harms "the treacherous uncertainties of strict products liability imposed by courts can
be reduced by at least one firm anchor to the traditional values of freedom of
contract." Id. (footnote omitted); see Phillips, supra note 117, at 479-80.
171. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
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barred from bringing his action if the defendant had included a
disclaimer that met the Code's formal requirements, if the plaintiff
had failed to give timely notice of the breach, or if the statute of
limitations, which would accrue on tender, had run.
Such an approach would, of course, lead to considerably more
defendants' verdicts than presently occur. In fact, it would be an
unqualified return to the pre-strict liability days when the citadel of
privity and other procedural elements acted to bar injured plaintiffs
from recovery. 172  From the point of view of economic benefit to
industry, such an approach is appealing. It has been argued that strict
liability is a highly inefficient way to allocate loss caused by defective
products because it requires resort to the tort litigation system-a
cumbersome and costly process. 173  Moreover, since this loss in most
172. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
173. See Birnbaum II, supra note 91, at 643-44 (if society's goal is to provide
insurance against product-caused harms, then legislation-not the tort litigation
system-should do so); Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 153, 191-92 n.107 (1976) (it is the victim, rather than the defendant,
who is usually in the best position to distribute his losses through insurance and other
welfare programs); Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by
Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 938, 946 (1957) (strict
liability is merely "crass expediency seeking its ends without an) particular regard for
basic principles"). In the Oregon decision adopting strict liability in that state, Judge
Bryson dissented, stating: "I am not willing to place the court in a position of
adopting a law based on a socialistic theory." Markle v. Mulhollands, Inc., 265 Or.
259, 297, 509 P.2d 529, 546 (1973). Professor Epstein does not advocate the contrac-
tual allocation approach. In fact, he is quite satisfied with the structure of strict
liability as it existed in the 1960's under Greenman and § 402A of the Restatement.
Epstein I, supra note 19, at 647-48. His major objections to strict liability as it exists
now are both to recent developments in the case law: (i) the ease with which a
plaintiff can get to a jury and the difficulty of resolving the case when he alleges that
the product, which performed as intended, could have been made safer, id. at
648-50, and (ii) the refusal to consider the plaintiff's own fault in reducing or
precluding recovery. Id. at 654-57. His first objection seems directed primarily at
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978),
which held the burden of proof can be shifted to the manufacturer to show his design
is reasonable. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. New York has not
followed this approach and in fact appears to strike a fair balance between the
plaintiff and the defendant on the issue of designing safety into a product. In
Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717
(1980), the Court of Appeals refused to find the manufacturer liable when the
plaintiff's employer removed a press's safety guards and held: "The manufacturer's
duty.. . does not extend to designing a product that is impossible to abuse or one
whose safety features may not be circumvented. A manufacturer need not incorpo-
rate safety features into its product so as to guarantee that no harm will come to
every user . . . .' Id. at 480-81, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721. Epstein
suggests that the legislature should establish safety standards for products. Epstein I,
supra note 19, at 651. Governmental regulatory efforts, however, have been largely
unsuccessful. W. Keeton, D. Owen & J. Montgomery, supra note 26, at 17. With
respect to Epstein's second objection-that strict liability avoids a consideration of
the plaintiff's own fault-it should be noted that New York had always permitted the
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cases is placed on the manufacturer and since the judgments are
usually quite high, industry is being overly burdened by strict liabil-
ity. 7 4 The adoption of breach of warranty, subject to all of the
elements in the Code, would both protect business and conveniently
place the loss on those who have accepted the risk.
A number of objections, however, can be made to such a sugges-
tion. First, a blanket acceptance of the Code as the sole means of
remedying product-caused harms is not necessarily a more efficient
allocation of loss than strict liability. Undoubtedly such an approach
will not lead to a reasoned bargaining of risks. The inequality of
bargaining power will result in the instant re-emergence of contracts
of adhesion, by which manufacturers can successfully avoid their
liability and shift the loss to the buyer.17
Such a shift only appears to provide an efficient allocation of the
loss. Because most individuals are unable to pay the massive medical
expenses of an accident and to be economically self-sufficient either
permanently or through a period of convalescence, the question of
allocation of loss will focus not only on this contract, but on how
much of the loss will be borne by the individual, by his insurers, by his
employer, by his friends and family members, by government, or by
society as a whole. Resolving this issue seems no less cumbersome than
tort law, which limits the allocation issue to two parties: the plaintiff,
defense of contributory negligence prior to 1975, Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330,
342-43, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 469-70 (1973), and comparative
fault after that date. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 1411 (McKinney 1976). Thus, Epstein's
major objections to strict liability would be essentially inapplicable in New York. He
would, however, object to the recent decision in Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52
N.Y.2d 114, 124-26, 417 N.E.2d 545, 550-51, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 256-57 (1980)(evidence of subsequent design modification admissible on issue of liability in strict
liability action). See Epstein I, supra note 19, at 661-62. See generally Epstein,
Intentional Harms, 4 J. Legal Stud. 391 (1975); Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent
Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. Legal Stud. 165 (1974); Epstein, A Theory of
Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Epstein 111.
174. See Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1189 (5th Cir. 1971) (the
interest in avoiding injury must be balanced against the need for successful industry
and business), overruled on other grounds, Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641
F.2d 1128, 1141 (5th Cir. 1981) (compliance with industry standards, a defense
allowed by Ward, held not dispositive of liability); Birnbaum I, supra note 19, at
252-55. The objection to the cumbersome nature of strict liability and the unfairness
of the process relates mostly to design defects, see supra note 91, not manufacturing
defects. See Epstein I, supra note 19, at 646-48. However, according to a Depart-
ment of Commerce survey of product liability cases between 1971 and 1976, design
defects accounted for 39 % of all cases, and of these, plaintiffs were successful in 46 %
of the cases. 3 U.S. Department of Commerce Interagency Task Force on Product
Liability, Product Liability: Final Report of the Legal Study 82-87 (1977). Thus, it
should not be assumed that objections to strict liability pervade all situations of
product-caused harms.
175. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 390-91, 161 A.2d
69, 86-87 (1960).
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who bears the loss to the extent of his own fault, 76 and the defendant,
which as a manufacturing corporation has a ready-made system for
distributing the loss through product pricing and insurance. 77
Although it would appear that contractual allocation would benefit
business, it can be argued that the final effect of such allocation will
be as detrimental as strict liability. Fewer plaintiffs' judgments would
result in less incentive to improve safety, and thus more injuries. A
long-term adverse effect will occur as purchasers, increasingly aware
that they may have no remedy for injuries resulting from harmful
products, avoid unproven products.
Even assuming, arguendo, that warranty actions are an efficient
means of allocating the loss, accepting efficiency as the only major
goal of the legal process with respect to products liability actions is
short-sighted. One commentator has suggested that a developed soci-
ety such as ours, which has risen above a subsistence level, can afford
to be somewhat inefficient if doing so will compensate individuals for
harm and death. 178
Second, throughout this century, the legal system has struggled to
free strict liability from the obstructions of its breach of warranty
heritage and create a new cause of action. 7 9 Courts and legislatures
would not so casually return to the nineteenth century. In fact, not
one state has adopted this contractual allocation approach to the
exclusion of strict liability or a comparable theory.
Third, any adoption of the Code with adjustments of provisions
unfair to injured parties would have adverse effects. For instance, the
Code's statute of limitations could be modified to run from the date of
injury, instead of tender,18 0 in the case of personal injury breach of
warranty actions. Such modifications, however, would destroy the
uniformity of the Code, a body of law that, by definition, is meant to
be uniform. Second and more important, these alterations would shift
the decision as to the allocation of risk of injury from the parties to
society as a whole. This would be inconsistent with the initial premise
of the contractual allocation theory-that the parties should decide
where the loss is to fall. In fact, those states that do use the Code in
place of strict liability-Massachusetts and Delaware-have so al-
176. See generally Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 795, 575 P.2d 1162,
144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977).
177. See W. Keeton, D. Owen & J. Montgomery, supra note 26, at 211-14.
178. Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Normative Model for Impos-
ing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 Mercer L. Rev. 465 (1978). See
generally Bernacchi, A Behavioral Model for Imposing Strict Liability in Tort: The
Importance of Analyzing Product Performance in Relation to Consumer Expectation
and Frustration, 47 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 43 (1978); Green, Strict Liability under Section
402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 1185 (1976).
179. See supra notes 22-44 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
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tered the Code that in personal injury situations it is virtually identical
to strict liability and does nothing to effectuate contractual allocation
of the loss.'18
Thus it is highly unlikely that society is presently willing to accept
breach of warranty as the sole remedy for product-caused harms. Nor
is it likely that doing so would result in any advantages that could not
be better gained through the use of strict liability. In coming to the
same conclusion, Dean Prosser observed that as a means to effect
personal injury recovery, breach of warranty is "more trouble than it
is worth." 182
C. Retaining Strict Liability
Strict liability alone is fully capable of adequately providing the
type and level of protection from dangerous products that society
requires, 1 3 and most states hold that it is the preferred mechanism for
redressing product-caused harms. 18 4 If strict liability is to some extent
inefficient in allocating loss, the absence of any evidence that breach
of warranty is more efficient neutralizes this criticism.1 88 Moreover,
181. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
182. W. Prosser, supra note 21, at 656. "[Vlery few injured parties can satisfy all
the Code's technical prerequisites to the bringing of a suit thereunder." Weinburger,
supra note 137, at 33-34 (emphasis in original).
183. See Epstein I, supra note 19, at 646-48.
184. See Maynard v. General Elec. Co., 486 F.2d 538, 540 (4th Cir. 1973); Anglo
E. Bulkships Ltd. v. Ameron, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1212, 1213 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Tyler
v. R.R. Street & Co., 322 F. Supp. 541, 543-44 (E.D. Va. 1971); Clary v. Fifth Ave.
Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244, 248 (Alaska 1969); Becker v. Volkswagen of
Am., Inc., 52 Cal. App. 3d 794, 799-802, 125 Cal. Rptr. 326, 329-31 (1975); Fisher
v. Gate City Steel Corp., 190 Neb. 699, 703, 211 N.W.2d 914, 917 (1973); Realmuto
v. Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336, 345, 322 A.2d 440, 444 (1974); Manleri v.
Volkswagenwerk A.G., 151 N.J. Super. 422, 430, 376 A.2d 1317, 1321-22 (App. Div.
1977); Mead v. Warner Pruyn Div., 57 A.D.2d 340, 343-44, 394 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485
(1977); Weinberger, supra note 137, at 33. "Apparently, the Court of Appeals of
[New York] is desirous of removing personal injury product liability suits from the
sphere of influence of the Uniform Commercial Code." Id. The Model Uniform
Product Liability Act provides for the preemption of the breach of warranty action
by a statutory cause of action that is, in effect, a negligence-oriented form of strict
liability. Model Uniform Product Liability Act §§ 103(A), 104(B) (Proposed Official
Draft 1979), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,720-21 (1979). While there is little
reason to retain both strict liability and breach of warranty, see supra pt. Ill. A,
some justification exists for the retention of straight negligence as an alternative cause
of action to whichever strict-type of action is retained. See Rheingold, The Expand-
ing Liability of the Product Supplier: A Primer, 2 Hofstra L. Rev. 521, 531 (1974).
185. It has been advocated too that both strict liability and breach of warranty
should be replaced by traditional negligence in processing product liability claims.
Birnbaum, supra note 91, at 645-48. Several objections, however, can be raised to
such an approach. First, nearly all design defect litigation based on strict liability, see
supra note 91, involves a negligence-type analysis. See Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg.,
Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66, 69-70 (Ky. 1973). Thus, it can be argued that a body of
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strict liability is free from the ties to commercial and business law that
characterize the breach of warranty action and have been found to
complicate, rather than aid, the just resolution of product liability
litigation. 18 6
Some commentators have pointed out the heavy burden products
liability law places on business.'17  To the extent the law does so, it
often runs contrary to the principles of economic efficiency, a doctrine
of jurisprudence that pervaded tort law in the 1960's and 1970's.'3
The economic approach, for which the chief spokesmen are Professors
Calabresi 8 9 and Posner,' 90 would place the burden of accidents wher-
negligence-oriented law adjusted to the peculiarities of product accidents has been
developed and should not be disturbed. Second, to have negligence as the only cause
of action for product harms would be to deny any recovery to those persons injured
by unit or manufacturing defects, see supra note 91, since the vast majority of such
defects occur simply by happenstance and not through any negligence or other fault
on'the part of the manufacturer.
186. See Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 598 S.W.2d 24, 28 (Tex. Civ. App.),
rev'd on other grounds, 610 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980); Franklin, When Worlds Col-
lide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 Stan. L. Rev.
974 (1966). "[O]ne is left with regret that the Code, devoted so extensively to dealings
within the business community, decided to try its hand at the products liability
problem. That it did so is clear. That it should have is much less clear. The consider-
ations involved in the products cases are so different from traditional commercial
dealings that the Code's insistence on covering all of an abstract 'commercial' area
may unfortunately lead to similar treatment for dissimilar problems." Id. at 1019-20.
"As the accident toll of modern life has increased, the urge towards strict liability has
grown. Many older forms of liability were vehicles for such a principle but none of
them is well adapted to solving our present accident problem. Warranty . .. was
fashioned to serve commercial needs in a commercial context, and however well or ill
adapted it is to that end today, its technicalities and limitations reflect those needs. If
it occasionally happens to fit the needs of accident law, that is pure coincidence.'"
James, supra note 19, at 227. See generally Dickerson, The ABC's of Products
Liability-With a Close Look at Section 402A and the Code, 36 Tenn. L. Rev. 439
(1969); Donnelley & Donnelley, Commercial Law, 1975 Survey of New York Law,
27 Syracuse L. Rev. 277 (1976).
187. See Birnbaum I, supra note 19, at 252-55; Epstein I, supra note 19, at
659-62.
188. R. Rabin, Perspectives on Tort Law 141-42 (1976); Teachout, Book Review,
67 Va. L. Rev. 815, 842-45 (1981).
189. Recent major works by Professor Calabresi include G. Calabresi, The Cost of
Accidents (1970), excerpted in Perspectives on Tort Law 142 (R. Rabin ed. 1976):
Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents: To Fleming James Jr., il miglior
fabbro, 84 Yale L.J. 656 (1975); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict
Liability in Torts, 81 Yale L.J. 1055 (1972).
190. Recent major works by Professor Posner include Ehrlich & Posner, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257 (1974); Landes & Posner,
Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law
and Altruism, 7 J. Legal Stud. 83 (1978); Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and
Legal Theory, 8 J. Legal Stud. 103 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Posner I]; Posner,
Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. Legal Stud. 205 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Posner
II]. See generally Minda, The Lawyer-Economist at Chicago: Richard A. Posner arid
the Economic Analysis of Law, 39 Ohio St. L.J. 439 (1978).
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ever the economic cost to society would be the least. 9' A contrasting
approach, embodying a humanistic view, has recently gained cur-
rency. 92  This approach to tort law, espoused by Professors
Fletcher 193 and Hubbard, 194 embraces the position that freedom from
suffering and death should be the primary considerations in products
liability law. 95 If this trend reflects society's current preferences for
191. "[T]he economist ... tends to define the good, the right, or the just as the
maximization of 'welfare' in a sense indistinguishable from the utilitarian's concept of
... happiness .... But for my normative purposes I want to define the maximand
more narrowly, as 'value' in the economic sense of the term or . . . as 'wealth.'
Posner I, supra note 190, at 119 (footnotes omitted). The author summarizes the
economic theory: "[T]he wealth-maximization principle implies, first, an initial
distribution of individual rights (to life, liberty, and labor) to their natural owners;
second, free markets to enable those rights to be reassigned from time to time to other
uses; third, legal rules that simulate the operations of the market when the costs of
market transactions are prohibitive; fourth, a system of legal remedies for deterring
and redressing invasions of rights; and fifth, a system of personal morality ... that
serves to reduce the costs of market transactions." Id. at 127. "[T]he dominant
function of the fault system is to generate rules of liability that if followed will bring
about, at least approximately, the efficient-the cost-justified-level of accidents
and safety .... Because we do not like to see resources squandered, a judgment of
negligence has inescapable overtones of moral disapproval, for it implies that there
was a cheaper alternative to the accident. Conversely, there is no moral indignation
in the case in which the cost of prevention would have exceeded the cost of the
accident." Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29, 33 (1972) (footnote
omitted). Professor Posner has pointed out the shortcomings of strict liability as a
means to achieve economic efficiency. Posner II, supra note 190, at 221. Yet It
appears that he is speaking not of strict products liability in which a negligence-type
analysis is made before liability attaches, but a theoretical strict liability in which
society holds the defendant liable without any fault on his part whatsoever.
192. Teachout, supra note 188, at 844-45. "[T]he moral philosophers have set
about developing theoretical systems based on 'natural rights' philosophy to counter
the utilitarianism of the economists and to hold the idea of 'justice' (in tort law,
'corrective justice') up against the economists' central principle of 'efficiency.' "Id. at
845 (footnote omitted). The current moralist approach to tort law should be termed a
re-emergence since the latest theories espousing the view have been motivated In
response to the popularity of economic analysis of the 1960's and 1970's. A moralistic
approach to tort law clearly antedates the economic view and in fact permeates such
seminal tort works as 0. Holmes, The Common Law (1881).
193. For an exposition of Professor Fletcher's theory, see Fletcher, Fairness and
Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1972). Professor Fletcher has sought to
overcome traditional fault/no-fault tort analysis and create a new methodology
phrased in terms of conflicting paradigms of reciprocity and reasonableness.
194. For a discussion of Professor Hubbard's analysis, see Hubbard, supra note
178; Hubbard, Efficiency, Expectation, and Justice: A jurisprudential Analysis of the
Concept of Unreasonably Dangerous Product Defect, 28 S.C. L. Rev. 587 (1977).
Professor Epstein is considered a humanist, or moralist, too, as opposed to an econo-
mist. His view does not center on protection from harm-producing acts. Rather he
attaches most importarnce to individual freedom of action. See Epstein II, supra note
173.
195. Teachout, supra note 188, at 844. "What is most striking about the econo-
mists' view is that it leaves out entirely the central fact of human suffering . ...
Within limits, economic theory can be useful in the law, but the ambitious move-
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the level of desired protection, 96 then clearly strict liability, as op-
posed to contractual allocation of risk, is the proper choice for redress-
ing product-caused harms.19 7
ment to make economic efficiency the central rationalizing principle of the law has
far-reaching and destructive implications." Id. at 844 n.112. Professor Hubbard
concludes that expectations, rather than efficiency, represent a better test for attach-
ing liability in a developed society such as ours. Hubbard, supra note 178, at 468-70;
see Klemme, supra note 173, at 190. See generally Dworkin, Seven Critics, 11 Ca. L.
Rev. 1201 (1977); Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of
Law, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1015 (1978). Although an advocate of economic analysis,
Professor Calabresi recognizes that "[j]ustice notions attach to ...societal prefer-
ences" that cannot easily be explained in economic terms and that they too are
"'crucial to the choice of liability rules." Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 189, at
1080 (footnote omitted).
196. New York courts have unquestionably favored plaintiffs bringing suits based
on strict liability for product-caused injuries. See, e.g., Caprara v. Chrysler Corp.,
52 N.Y.2d 114, 124-26, 417 N.E.2d 545, 550-51, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 256-57 (1980)
(evidence of subsequent design modifications admissible in strict liability action, even
though it would not be in a negligence suit and even though trial court submitted
case solely on issue of manufacturing defect); Halloran v. Virginia Chems., Inc., 41
N.Y.2d 386, 388, 361 N.E.2d 991, 993, 393 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (1977) (once plaintiff
shows that the product has not performed as intended and he has excluded all causes
of the harm that cannot be attributed to the defendant, "the fact finder may, even if
the particular defect has not been proven, infer that the accident could only have
occurred due to some defect in the product .... "); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d
330, 339, 298 N.E.2d 622, 626, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 466 (1973) ("A developing and
more analytical sense of justice, as regards both the economics and the operational
aspects of production and distribution [,] has imposed a heavier ... burden of
responsibility on the manufacturer.").
197. This Note does not suggest that any emphasis given to the humanistic orienta-
tion in products liability law requires a shift in the major tests used to determine
whether a product is defective. The tests are the risk/utility balancing test and the
consumer expectations test. The risk/utility test to determine defectiveness derives
from the negligence analysis set forth by Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). The determination of unrea-
sonable danger involves "a balancing of the probability and seriousness of harm
against the costs of taking precautions .... Relevant factors to be considered include
the availability of alternative designs, the costs and feasibility of adopting alternative
designs, and the frequency or infrequency of injury ....." Ranev v. Hone'vell,
Inc., 540 F.2d 932, 935 (8th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted). This test, modified in
various ways to give plaintiffs an advantage over the standard negligence require-
ments, has become the most widely used analysis for determining unreasonable
danger. Birnbaum II, supra note 91, at 605; see Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269
Or. 485, 492, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974) ("A dangerously defective article would be
one which a reasonable person would not put into the stream of commerce if he had
knowledge of its harmful character. The test, therefore, is whether the seller would
be negligent if he sold the article knowing of the risk involved. Strict liability imposes
what amounts to constructive knowledge of the condition of the product." (emphasis
in original) (footnotes omitted)); Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory
and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. Rev.
803, 844 (1976) ("[T]he unreasonable danger model transforms the somewhat subjec-
tive risk-benefit approach of negligence law . . . into an objective evaluation of the
true costs and benefits of the product as marketed in its particular condition."
(emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort
Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973) (among the elements to be
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If strict liability is to be the only cause of action, legislation should
be enacted to so position it.19 8 Such a codification should indicate the
level of protection products liability law will provide. Most jurisdic-
tions follow the formulation of the Restatement,' 9 although various
efforts have been made by courts and commentators to adjust the
considered in balancing risk and utility are the usefulness of the product, its safe or
unsafe nature, the availability of substitutes, the ability to make it safe, the user's
ability to avoid harm, the user's awareness of the dangers, and the feasibility of
spreading the loss). The consumer expectations test adopted by the Restatement, on
the other hand, allows the jury to find an unreasonably dangerous defect if the
"article sold [is] dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to
the community as to its characteristics." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A
comment i (1965). This borrowing of consumer expectations from pre-Code war-
ranty law may lead courts to continue to use the unreasonably dangerous defect
standard in Code warranty actions. See Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514
S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) ("[Defendant auto dealer] testified that,
based on his forty-five years of sales experience, the average consumer believes that a
sedan vehicle will be a reasonably safe product in a roll-over."); Vincer v. Esther
Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 332, 230 N.W.2d 794,
798 (1975) ("If the average consumer would reasonably anticipate the dangerous
condition of the product and fully appreciate the attendant risk of injury, it would
not be unreasonably dangerous and defective."); Fischer, Products Liability- The
Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. Rev. 339, 348 (1974) ("The consumer expectations test
is natural since strict liability in tort developed from the law of warranty. The law of
implied warranty is vitally concerned with protecting justified expectations since this
is a fundamental policy of the law of contracts." (footnotes omitted)). Risk/utility Is
generally associated with economic analysis, while the consumer expectations test is
associated with the humanistic approach. In giving effect to a humanistic orientation
of product tort law, however, there need not, indeed should not, be a shift from the
risk/utility approach to the consumer expectations approach. The latter test, it Is
generally felt, simply does not work. Montgomery & Owen, supra, at 823 ("[A]n
attempt to determine the consumer's reasonable expectations of safety concerning a
technologically complex product may well be an exercise in futility, for the consumer
may have at most only a generalized expectancy-perhaps more accurately only an
unconscious hope-that the product will not harm him if he treats it with a reason-
able amount of care." (footnote omitted)); see Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481
F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973); Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a
Product Have to BeP, 42 Ind. L.J. 301, 306 (1967) ("The reasonable expectations of
consumers provide a helpful guide, but a slippery one."); Rheingold, What Are the
Consumer's "Reasonable Expectations"?, 22 Bus. Law. 589, 593 n.16 (1967) ("[A]
consumer with less than ordinary expectations, based upon particular expertise,
should not gain from having ordinary expectations credited to him." (emphasis in
original)). Thus, rather than a shift of test, other means can be used to attain this
humanistic orientation, such as an extended statute of limitations or the reduced
standard of liability.
198. See supra notes 138-53 and accompanying text.
199. Handy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 596, 606-07 (D. Del. 1971); Phipps v.
General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 349-52, 363 A.2d 955, 961-63 (1976). This level
of protection is held to be less than absolute liability but greater than negligence. See
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 882-83 (Alaska 1979); Ault v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 118, 528 P.2d 1148, 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812,
814 (1974); Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 464, 255 N.E.2d
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formula. 20 0  For instance, the Model Uniform Product Liability Act
includes a statute of repose, which raises the presumption that some-
thing other than the defective nature of the product caused the harm
if it occurred more than ten years after the sale of the product20' On
the other hand, some states have eliminated the "unreasonably dan-
gerous" requirement from the Restatement's standard with respect to
"defect" so that plaintiff will have an easier burden of proof.202
In New York, both the Code and case law provide clues as to the
level of protection to be codified in strict liability. Codling is the
starting point for the definition of the action.20 3 It can, however, be
broadened to reflect the current social temperament. The 1975
amendment to section 2-318 204 expanded the protection of the Code to
all consumers. 20 5  If this adjustment is an accurate reflection of soci-
ety's preferences,2 0 6 then the desired level of protection can best be
provided by the following steps: (i) eliminate from the Code section
2-715(2)(b),20 7 which states that personal injury and property dam-
age20 8 are consequential damages, and section 2-318,20" thereby elimi-
173, 175-76, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942, 944-45 (1969); Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503
S.W.2d 516, 519-20 (Tenn. 1973); Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability,
17 Stan. L. Rev. 1077, 1088-89 (1965).
200. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 882-83 (Alaska
1979); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209, 213-14
(Alaska 1975); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 456, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225, 238 (1978); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150,
175-76, 406 A.2d 140, 152-53 (1979); Phelan & Apfeld, Substantive Developments,
in Product Liability Update 11-18 (P.L.I. Litigation & Administrative Practice Series
1980).
201. Model Uniform Product Liability Act § 110(B) (Proposed Official Draft
1979), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,732 (1979).
202. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 63-65.
204. See supra note 18.
205. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 196.
207. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (McKinney 1964). This section states that personal
injury and property damage are recoverable consequentially. A further provision
might be the prohibition against use of the breach of warranty cause of action to
recover for personal injury. The necessity for such a prohibition stems from § 2-
715(2)(a), which provides the general rule on recovery of consequential damages:
They may be recovered if they result from needs of which the seller had reason to
know at the time of contracting. Since it would be theoretically possible to allow
personal injury recovery under such a provision, an additional clause making clear
that strict liability is the only means of recovering for personal injury perhaps should
be added.
208. Eliminating the Code as a means to recover for property damage will make
no significant difference in the law. Codling permits recovery for injury "or dam-
ages," thus making property damage fully recoverable under the strict liability
theory in New York. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29,
345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 469-70 (1973).
209. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). California has eliminated
this section from its version of the Code. See Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104,
117-20, 534 P.2d 377, 385-87, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681, 689-91 (1975).
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nating breach of warranty as a remedy for personal injury;210
(ii) amend the tort statute of limitations to run four years from the
date of the harm in the case of product-caused injuries;21' and
(iii) codify Codling, absent any reference to a requirement of showing
"'unreasonable danger." 21 2 This would consolidate the aspects of the
Code that the legislature apparently thought should be extended to all
plaintiffs in a strict tort liability action, while maintaining the Code
as a body of pure sales law 213 and eliminating any confusion created
by duplicative actions.
On the other hand, if the legislature is content with the protection
afforded by the Codling standard, it should merely eliminate the
aforementioned Code sections21 4 and codify Codling.215 In doing so,
the legislature should also determine the level of product quality for
which liability will attach: defectiveness alone, which is the present
Codling standard,2 16 or unreasonably dangerous defectiveness, which
210. It has been suggested that as a means to curtail the use of the Code in
redressing product-related injuries-an apparent goal of New York courts-strict
construction of the Code's requirements be adopted. Doing so would radically reduce
the availability of the breach of warranty action under the Code and make strict
liability practically the sole remedy for product related harms. Weinberger, supra
note 137, at 33-34. This is so because very few plaintiffs could meet the technical
requirements of the Code. Id.
211. The legislature has singled out another class for special treatment with regard
to the statute of limitations: N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1980-
1981) provides that medical malpractice suits must be brought within two and
one-half years of accrual. Other personal injury actions must be brought within
three. Id. § 214.
212. See Recent Developments, supra note 128, at 605 ("A decision either to reject
or to retain the unreasonably dangerous standard requires that a court determine, as
a matter of policy, which level of duty should be imposed on a manufacturer."). It
can be argued that legislatures are in as good a position as courts to make such a
determination. See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1531, 1552-58, 1565-73
(1973) (design defect situations too "polycentric," i.e., complex, for the litigation
process).
213. In response to any assertion that such an approach is too favorable to the
plaintiff and will result in serious hardships to the defendant, it should be recalled
that New York, unlike some jurisdictions, has always allowed a consideration of the
plaintiff's own fault in determining whether plaintiff might prevail or the amount of
plaintiff's recovery. See Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342-45, 298 N.E.2d 622,
628-30, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 469-72 (1973); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 1411 (McKinney
1976).
214. See supra notes 207, 209.
215. Codification would not be necessary to retain strict liability as it presently
exists under Codling. A clear legislative definition of the cause of action and its
standard of liability, however, would avoid the inconsistent formulations of strict
liability now occurring throughout the state. See supra note 93 and accompanying
text.
216. See supra note 63.
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is the Restatement's. 21 7 In this way, every person injured would be
able to sue under a consistent strict tort doctrine and would have three
years in which to do so-a period of time that does not seem uncon-
scionably short.218 This solution, while perhaps not in harmony with
the preferred basis of tort law, 219 would at least have the considerable
advantage of clearing the muddy waters now surrounding products
liability law in New York.
CONCLUSION
In the chronology of legal doctrines, products liability law is still
quite young. Yet of necessity its formative years must soon end. The
costs involved and the burdens to both the injured party and enter-
prise are too great to allow casual, unpremeditated adjustments to the
system, such as the New York amendment to section 2-318 of the
Code. Moreover, society appears to be entering a period during which
inflation and dwindling resources will greatly aggravate the effects of
these burdens.
For these reasons, it is vital to minimize confusion and uncertainty
by selecting and implementing a single theory of products liability
that most closely reflects society's preferred level of protection from
defective products. In New York, the first step is the elimination of
one of the virtually identical causes of action now used to remedy
product harms: strict liability or breach of warranty. The commercial
orientation of the Code, the noncommercial nature of most product-
caused accidents, and the existence in New York of a workable strict
tort doctrine all dictate that the Code yield the role of remedying
non-negligent product harms to strict liability.
Jeffery W. Deaver
217. See supra note 1.
218. It seems doubtful that consumer ignorance today is so pervasive that the
requirement that plaintiffs, injured seriously enough to consider litigation, do so
within three years of the injury would work any hardships. See Phillips, supra note
117, at 475-76 ("It is entirely conceivable that. . the claimant might not recognize
his cause of action until he consults a lawyer. But such claims are probably atypical
of the majority of products liability suits in which a potential claimant would
normally suspect defectiveness when damage occurs.").
219. See supra note 196.
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